Showing posts with label guy neighbors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label guy neighbors. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Federal Prosecutor Marietta Parker Deliberatly Sending Mail to the Wrong Address
Federal Prosecutor Deliberatly Sending Mail to the Wrong Address
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 6
','
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20t24-CM OS-20tOS-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
Request for Judicial clerks oversight of mailings and change of address COMES NOW on this N d a y of July 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors,
acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk. 1). The U.S. Attorney seems to be having a problem with getting the Defendant [I]'s name and address correct on her recent mailings and this is causing undue delay and the potential of Prejudice. Whereby giving rise to the appearance of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. (See attachment 1). 2). The Defendant would also notify the court that a second certified mailing perhaps from the U.S. Attorney's office sent to Defendant [1] via certified mail, has now become
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 6
undeliverable and the card appears to have been originally addressed to 1144 Andover, then changed to 1104 with scribbles over said number. (See attachment 2.) 3). This certified mailing is currently missing. The Lawrence Kansas Vermont street Post office is currently attempting to locate this mailing and will notify Defendant [1] iffound. 4). There are currently two pending sealed motions by the U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker which Defendant [1] conveniently has not received, has no access to on the Pacer site, and has been unable to respond to. 5). Defendant [1] requests that the court also order all future mailings in this cause of action from the U.S. Attorney's office, Kansas District Court, be sent to the Defendant at her business address which is her daytime address and thus will allow her to sign for any certified mailings at the time of delivery: Carrie Marie Neighbors Yellow House Store, 1904 Massachusetts, Lawrence Kansas, 66046 Intentionally mailing the Defendant necessary court documents to the wrong address gives the appearance by the Government of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. An abuse of discretion standard of review is applied in [960 F2d 150 Taylor v. Warren County Regional Jail] "plaintiffstated that he was unable to respond to the motions to dismiss or the magistrate judge's reports because his mail was sent to the wrong address" See Ref Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F2d 1512,1522 (lOth Cir.1988). "In reviewing such a dismissal, three factors are considered: 1) the degree ofactual prejudice to the defendant; 2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; and 3) the culpability ofthe litigant. DeBardeleben, 937 F2d at 504. "
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 6
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk and also sent to the Defendant [l]'s daytime Business address.
Car . rs Defendant [1] / Pro Se Li gant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
'l::'k~~~c.:~i~jgf~~I~~.t~:l!;§W~,3;;:;r~~-----~
Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 6
11 1
11J! 1
'H l' "l''1111! II/n,! 1/ f/'11' I,ll' IhI,tiP/II
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 Guy Neighbors 11520031 CCA Leavenworth 100 Highway Terrace Leavenworth, KS. 66048 On this ~ day of July 2010.
itigant
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 6
','
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20t24-CM OS-20tOS-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
Request for Judicial clerks oversight of mailings and change of address COMES NOW on this N d a y of July 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors,
acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk. 1). The U.S. Attorney seems to be having a problem with getting the Defendant [I]'s name and address correct on her recent mailings and this is causing undue delay and the potential of Prejudice. Whereby giving rise to the appearance of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. (See attachment 1). 2). The Defendant would also notify the court that a second certified mailing perhaps from the U.S. Attorney's office sent to Defendant [1] via certified mail, has now become
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 6
undeliverable and the card appears to have been originally addressed to 1144 Andover, then changed to 1104 with scribbles over said number. (See attachment 2.) 3). This certified mailing is currently missing. The Lawrence Kansas Vermont street Post office is currently attempting to locate this mailing and will notify Defendant [1] iffound. 4). There are currently two pending sealed motions by the U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker which Defendant [1] conveniently has not received, has no access to on the Pacer site, and has been unable to respond to. 5). Defendant [1] requests that the court also order all future mailings in this cause of action from the U.S. Attorney's office, Kansas District Court, be sent to the Defendant at her business address which is her daytime address and thus will allow her to sign for any certified mailings at the time of delivery: Carrie Marie Neighbors Yellow House Store, 1904 Massachusetts, Lawrence Kansas, 66046 Intentionally mailing the Defendant necessary court documents to the wrong address gives the appearance by the Government of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. An abuse of discretion standard of review is applied in [960 F2d 150 Taylor v. Warren County Regional Jail] "plaintiffstated that he was unable to respond to the motions to dismiss or the magistrate judge's reports because his mail was sent to the wrong address" See Ref Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F2d 1512,1522 (lOth Cir.1988). "In reviewing such a dismissal, three factors are considered: 1) the degree ofactual prejudice to the defendant; 2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; and 3) the culpability ofthe litigant. DeBardeleben, 937 F2d at 504. "
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 6
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk and also sent to the Defendant [l]'s daytime Business address.
Car . rs Defendant [1] / Pro Se Li gant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
'l::'k~~~c.:~i~jgf~~I~~.t~:l!;§W~,3;;:;r~~-----~
Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 6
11 1
11J! 1
'H l' "l''1111! II/n,! 1/ f/'11' I,ll' IhI,tiP/II
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 Guy Neighbors 11520031 CCA Leavenworth 100 Highway Terrace Leavenworth, KS. 66048 On this ~ day of July 2010.
itigant
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 4
Federal Prosecutor Marietta Parker Deliberatly Sending Mail to the Wrong Address
Federal Prosecutor Deliberatly Sending Mail to the Wrong Address
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 6
','
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20t24-CM OS-20tOS-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
Request for Judicial clerks oversight of mailings and change of address COMES NOW on this N d a y of July 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors,
acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk. 1). The U.S. Attorney seems to be having a problem with getting the Defendant [I]'s name and address correct on her recent mailings and this is causing undue delay and the potential of Prejudice. Whereby giving rise to the appearance of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. (See attachment 1). 2). The Defendant would also notify the court that a second certified mailing perhaps from the U.S. Attorney's office sent to Defendant [1] via certified mail, has now become
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 6
undeliverable and the card appears to have been originally addressed to 1144 Andover, then changed to 1104 with scribbles over said number. (See attachment 2.) 3). This certified mailing is currently missing. The Lawrence Kansas Vermont street Post office is currently attempting to locate this mailing and will notify Defendant [1] iffound. 4). There are currently two pending sealed motions by the U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker which Defendant [1] conveniently has not received, has no access to on the Pacer site, and has been unable to respond to. 5). Defendant [1] requests that the court also order all future mailings in this cause of action from the U.S. Attorney's office, Kansas District Court, be sent to the Defendant at her business address which is her daytime address and thus will allow her to sign for any certified mailings at the time of delivery: Carrie Marie Neighbors Yellow House Store, 1904 Massachusetts, Lawrence Kansas, 66046 Intentionally mailing the Defendant necessary court documents to the wrong address gives the appearance by the Government of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. An abuse of discretion standard of review is applied in [960 F2d 150 Taylor v. Warren County Regional Jail] "plaintiffstated that he was unable to respond to the motions to dismiss or the magistrate judge's reports because his mail was sent to the wrong address" See Ref Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F2d 1512,1522 (lOth Cir.1988). "In reviewing such a dismissal, three factors are considered: 1) the degree ofactual prejudice to the defendant; 2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; and 3) the culpability ofthe litigant. DeBardeleben, 937 F2d at 504. "
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 6
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk and also sent to the Defendant [l]'s daytime Business address.
Car . rs Defendant [1] / Pro Se Li gant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
'l::'k~~~c.:~i~jgf~~I~~.t~:l!;§W~,3;;:;r~~-----~
Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 6
11 1
11J! 1
'H l' "l''1111! II/n,! 1/ f/'11' I,ll' IhI,tiP/II
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 Guy Neighbors 11520031 CCA Leavenworth 100 Highway Terrace Leavenworth, KS. 66048 On this ~ day of July 2010.
itigant
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 6
','
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20t24-CM OS-20tOS-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
Request for Judicial clerks oversight of mailings and change of address COMES NOW on this N d a y of July 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors,
acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk. 1). The U.S. Attorney seems to be having a problem with getting the Defendant [I]'s name and address correct on her recent mailings and this is causing undue delay and the potential of Prejudice. Whereby giving rise to the appearance of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. (See attachment 1). 2). The Defendant would also notify the court that a second certified mailing perhaps from the U.S. Attorney's office sent to Defendant [1] via certified mail, has now become
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 6
undeliverable and the card appears to have been originally addressed to 1144 Andover, then changed to 1104 with scribbles over said number. (See attachment 2.) 3). This certified mailing is currently missing. The Lawrence Kansas Vermont street Post office is currently attempting to locate this mailing and will notify Defendant [1] iffound. 4). There are currently two pending sealed motions by the U.S. Attorney Marietta Parker which Defendant [1] conveniently has not received, has no access to on the Pacer site, and has been unable to respond to. 5). Defendant [1] requests that the court also order all future mailings in this cause of action from the U.S. Attorney's office, Kansas District Court, be sent to the Defendant at her business address which is her daytime address and thus will allow her to sign for any certified mailings at the time of delivery: Carrie Marie Neighbors Yellow House Store, 1904 Massachusetts, Lawrence Kansas, 66046 Intentionally mailing the Defendant necessary court documents to the wrong address gives the appearance by the Government of an abuse of discretion and interference with the judicial process. An abuse of discretion standard of review is applied in [960 F2d 150 Taylor v. Warren County Regional Jail] "plaintiffstated that he was unable to respond to the motions to dismiss or the magistrate judge's reports because his mail was sent to the wrong address" See Ref Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F2d 1512,1522 (lOth Cir.1988). "In reviewing such a dismissal, three factors are considered: 1) the degree ofactual prejudice to the defendant; 2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; and 3) the culpability ofthe litigant. DeBardeleben, 937 F2d at 504. "
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 6
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is requesting the court order any and all future mailing by the U.S. Attorney's office be checked for errors prior to mailing, by Judge Murgia's court clerk and also sent to the Defendant [l]'s daytime Business address.
Car . rs Defendant [1] / Pro Se Li gant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
'l::'k~~~c.:~i~jgf~~I~~.t~:l!;§W~,3;;:;r~~-----~
Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 6
11 1
11J! 1
'H l' "l''1111! II/n,! 1/ f/'11' I,ll' IhI,tiP/II
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM Document 186
Filed 07/12/10 Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 Guy Neighbors 11520031 CCA Leavenworth 100 Highway Terrace Leavenworth, KS. 66048 On this ~ day of July 2010.
itigant
Request for Oversight of Mailings and Change of Address
Page 4
Monday, July 12, 2010
MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES
07912297376
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 1 of 12
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff, v. Case No: 07-20073-CM
07-20t24-CM 08-20tOS-eM CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDNAT HI'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT [lJ'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES
COMES NOW on this
&th
day of July 2010, the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant,
is filing a Reply to the Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant [l]'s Motion to Exclude Witnesses. The Reply is as follows: 1.) In,-r 1, The Plaintiff states that "defendant's motion is without merit and should be denied in its entirety because rule 408 does not apply in criminal proceedings. However Defendant [1] asserts that the Plaintiffs reliance on that claim is misplaced." When in actuality the Defendant [1] can show that the Plaintiffs is both intentionally misleading, as well as, inaccurate in her statement before the court. Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 2 of 12
a). See Ref: The Fifth Circuit has held rule 408 applies in both civil and criminal proceedings. See United States v. Hays, 872 F2d 582,588-89 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that
Rule 408 applies in a criminal proceeding as well as a civil proceeding to bar The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit evidence of a settlement agreement) Rule 408 may apply in a criminal proceeding. b). See also: United States v. Skeddle, 176 FR.D. 254, 256 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (disagreeing with government's argument that Rule 408 does not apply in criminal proceedings, noting that H[n]othing in Rule 408 limits its application to civil litigation that was preceded by or included settlement negotiations'') and State v. Gano, 92 Hawai'i 161, 988 P.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Haw.1999) (discussing cases and concluding that "Rule 408 does apply in criminal proceedings ''). 2). Also note for the record, that the plaintiff has also intentionally left out 408 (b), in which states, "Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a) Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation." In which is so in this cause of action, whereby, this would not only disprove the Plaintiffs theory but assist the Defendant [1] in her ability to use Rule 408. a). The Government also states: "Clearly Rule 408 does not bar evidence of offers of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony or substantial assistance within the meaning of USSG § 5K1.1", in which states: "The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include ... the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant. "Id. at § 5K1.1 (a),(2). suggested in dicta that
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 3 of 12
Defendant [1] asserts that the provision of this law authorizes only that substantial assistance can be rewarded after it is rendered; It in no way authorizes the government to make a deal for testimony before it is given, as the Government has clearly done in this case. Consequently this statute cannot justify the government's deals with the witnesses in this case before the court. 3.) The Government claim's is that "No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness ..... testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence." Once again the plaintiff had intentionally left out the rest of United States v. Singleton, 165 F. 3d 1297, 1301 (1oth Or. 1999) in which states, "This ingrained practice of buying testimony indicates that suppression is necessary to compel respect for the statutory protections Congress has placed around testimony in federal courts. Exclusion is also necessary to remove the incentive to disregard the statute. See [Calandra, 414 Us. at 347 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 Us. 206, 217 (1960) (quoting US v. Singleton)]. "The benefits of deterrence outweigh the evil of excluding relevant evidence, and the balance falls heavily in favor of suppression". a.) The Government goes on to say that "Furthermore the weighing of evidence, the reconciliation of inconsistent testimony, and the assessment of a witness' credibility is solely within the province of the jury." b.) The Government claims that defendants motion provides no grounds for the exclusion of witness testimony and that the credibility to be accorded to any of the witnesses in these cases is clearly with the sole province of the jury and the defendants request for pretrial exclusion of
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 4 of 12
evidence on the ground that the agreements made between the Government and the witnesses have rendered their testimony unreliable is without foundation in fact or in law. The Defendant [1] disagrees, see ref: "The promise of intangible benefits imports as great a threat to a witness's truthfulness as a cash payment. " See [United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F 2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)] (lilt is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence .... "), cert. denied, 484
u.s. 1026
(1988); Schwartz, 785 F2d
at 680 ("A violation of trust which is influenced by the offer of an intangible service is no less damaging ... than if the influence was in the form of a cash kickback. "); United States v. Meinster, 619 F2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) ("We think it obvious that promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case. "); see also United States v. Kimble, 719 F2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating witness "admitted lying in over thirty different statements motivated by his sense of selfpreservation" under plea arrangement requiring his testimony in return for lenient sentence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). 4.) Government claims that several cooperating witnesses and an undercover police officer are expected to testify that they informed the defendant that the items that they were offering to sell defendant were stolen. The Defendant [1] asserts that the items sold by the undercover officer were indeed not stolen. Nor did the Officer state that his items were "stolen Property." Defendant is prepared to show proof to the court that indeed the Defendant did directly question the undercover officer about whether the items were stolen, and that parts of the conversation that would be exculpatory for the Defendant have been edited from the Audio of the video. Tainted testimony as to any direct conversations between defendant [1] and non-credible witnesses bribed by the
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 5 of 12
Government should be inadmissible as hearsay and has no place before ajury. The district court must at least make preliminary factual findings on the record regarding the admissibility of the statements. See United States v. Perez, 989 F2d 1574,1580 (lOth Cir. 1993) (en bane). 5.) The Government states that the issue ofthe credibility to be accorded to any of the witnesses in these cases is clearly within the sole province of the jury and the defendant's request for pretrial exclusion of evidence on the ground that the agreements made between the government and the witnesses have rendered their testimony unreliable is without foundation in fact or law. a). The Defendant [1] states that the witnesses in this case before this court clearly fall within the "Exclusionary Rule." "The principal reason behind the adoption of the exclusionary rule was the Government's failure to observe its own laws. " United States v. Russell, 411 Us. 423, 430 (1973) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 Us. 643, 659 (1961)). The exclusionary rule has been applied to constitutional, statutory, and procedural rule violations to deter unlawful conduct. See United States v. Blue, 384 Us. 251, 255 (l966). b). If the Governments Assistant U.S. Attorneys were to be allowed to present tainted witnesses before a Federal Jury the U.S. Attorneys would clearly be in violation of Kansas Professional Rule 3.4(b). Because clearly the promise ofleniency, years of freedom after a Federal conviction and sentencing, or not having serious charges added to an indictment are all an incentive to lie. The rule, adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas, provides, "A lawyer shall not ... offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b) (1997). This court must exclude any and all of the witnesses, due to the fact they have been tainted, in this case before this court, because clearly their testimony would be unreliable. Agreements to seek leniency, allow freedom after bond violations and Federal crime
Reply to Governments
Response to Defendant
[1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 5
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 6 of 12
conviction, or refrain from filing charges in return for testimony are entered into with the intention of presenting to a court the testimony so acquired. Excluding that tainted testimony removes the sole purpose of the unlawful conduct and leaves no incentive to violate § 201 ©(2). Cf. id. See Ref: USA v. Singleton (lOth cir. 1999) Courts will not be made party to lawlessness by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of illegality. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 (1968); Mapp, 367
u.s.
1, 12-13
u.s. at 660."But
we have found no case in which prosecutors, in their role as
lawyers representing the government after the initiation of criminal proceedings, have been granted a justification to violate generally applicable laws. " See United States v. Ryans, 903 F 2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir.) (Holding that disciplinary rule applies to prosecutors upon commencement of criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990). c.) The United states submits that the Government will be able to establish the defendant's "habitual pattern" of purchasing new, in the box items from regular customers at prices far below retail, allowing the reasonable inference to be drawn by the fact-finders that the defendant knew or should have known that the items she was buying were stolen had she not deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to her. d). The Government has presented no evidence to substantiate the claim that Defendant [1] had any knowledge that any of the items were stolen. Nor can a witness testify as to the state of mind of Defendant [1]. As most of the witnesses did not even know Defendants [1]'s name. The Government has already stated that the newer or new items brought in by sellers were purchased by the Defendant [1] at 50-80% of the retail value, (which is nowhere near "far below retail.)" All items purchased by the business were paid for by check. There is no evidence to establish the items were stolen, or that the Defendant would have knowledge of such, there were no theft reports or victims on file with the Lawrence Police Dept. connected to Defendant [1] or
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 7 of 12
[2] or the Business; Yellow House Quality Used Appliances Incorporated, search warrants.
at the time of the first
6.) The Defendant [1] however argues the Government has overstepped its bounds, and made a mockery of what Congress had intended when allowing for testimony under plea deals. See witness interrogation; (Parsons Video interrogation interviews, (Video 01)(R -1) Thurs. Oct. 12, 2006) And Parsons Interview 01(Camera 1) Thurs Oct. 19,2006.)) This witness is a
convicted felon caught in possession of3 firearms, sold an AK-47 Assault rifle, Narcotics and stolen property to an undercover officer and was not charged for the crimes in exchange for his agreement to testify that he conspired to conceal the conspiracy in the property case against Defendant [1]. To meet the ends of Justice for his promised testimony Mr. Parsons along with other witnesses have pled guilty to Federal crimes, have already been sentenced to Federal Prison, yet remain free, and have continued to flaunt the law with criminal acts while free on bond as payment for their promised testimony. Our Government is like the King. It demands respect from the people beneath it, it teaches people by its own example. If our Government condones people to break laws, then its people will have no respect for its law. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law "the end justifies the means" would mean this Court condones that this Government allows criminal acts in order to secure the conviction of a criminal would be a Perversion of everything our Forefathers stood for and our Country's soldiers have died for. Reply on the Footnote #2: Footnote 2) The Government states that the defendant's claim that the government has "offered money to its witnesses to manufacture a case" (doc. 227 at P 5) is incorrect. The Defendant asserts that this is an attempt by the Government to mislead the court. The Defendant [1] has
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 7
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 8 of 12
been informed by a number of witnesses that money was offered to them by the Government in exchange for their participation in the manufacturing of this case. [See ref Attach 1] a).Laura claims in her affidavit that someone within the Federal Bureau of Investigation offered her money to assist in the manufacturing of this case, in which is in violation ofFRE § 609 (a) (1) & (2), as well as, FRE Rule 408 (b) . . "We must balance the good of preventing future unlawful conduct with the evil of disallowing relevant evidence of guilt in an individual case". See United States v. Duchi, 944 F 2d, 391, 396 (8th Or. 1991). b). "To permit this unlawfully obtained evidence "to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law." United States v. Mitchell, 322 Us. 65, 67 (1944) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 Us. 332, 345 (1943). Whereby the Defendant [1] is correct in her Motion to Exclude Witnesses, in which need to be either suppressed or excluded. [See ref Attachment 1- Affidavit of Laura Helm dated 04/22/06] The Defendant [1] has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses should be excluded due to the Plaintiffs intentional misrepresentation before this tribunal.
THEREFORE the Defendant [1] is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [l]'s Motion to Exclude Witnesses. Wherefore for all the reasons set forth in the above referenced Reply, the Defendant [1] respectfully requests that the court deny the Governments response and exclude all witnesses pursuant to FRE § 609 (a) (I) & (2), as well as, FRE Rule 408 (b).
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 8
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 9 of 12
Respectfully submitted,
ca~~Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 9
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 10 of 12
/
WOOD INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, INC.
:"FFIDA VIT
1. Laura Helm. oflawful
age. being fully sworn upon oath, states;
That. in early March 2006. I was contacted by two men while I was staying at my brother's fRay Mayberry'} residence Ioested at 2200 Harper. C-44 Lawrence. Ks, I am unsure of the date. but I do recall it was several weeksago and it was during the week. (
believe. but 1 am not certain. that the date these two men contacted was March 6. !006 between 9:00 a.m .• 10:00 a.m. and interviewed me
Th;ll. these two men. approached my residence and asked (0 speak with me. 1can best describe the first man as a w/m. 5'05". a little belly and short spiky blonde hair. This man did most of the talking during our contact. He said his name. which ( do not
recall. and 'laid Ihey worked with the "Federal Bureau of Investigation." He did not say '. 3\ .1f\1~he ~tlid ,n.: entire bureau name, The second rnan was a w/m. short dark hair.
0'0" and a bigger build than the first man. The second man did Dot say much. The second man did tell me I was not in trouble. but Guy and Carrie Neighbors were. Both men were similarty dressed in slacks and shins. They both wore a badge on their belts and had guns in holsters made of light color leather that was also worn on their waist.
Ther, the first man told me r "had to talk to them." I asked him ifit "had to be today:' He said it did not have to be today and they agreed \0 come back the following dav These ,\m,"e~ retuned th.: ~le}(l ,iay imJ pick c me up in 'I ·jark Hue '1 'v !~r.'~' "j vemcle. ~Jtd not want ttl go with them. but feit trom the way they were acting that ( did not have ~I choice. They drove me to the Lawrence Police Department at 11,h and Massachusetts Street. Lawrence, KS, We went inside the building through an outside door. , n't'all the men entering in a :J15S code to the interior dOM that allowed us inside the police JepilClTTlCnl. '"Ye went into an interview room where both men talked to me. Thev ques(loned me about irerns I haLl sold to the Yellow House in the past. Thev told me ;hey okained my nome through checks that were written by the Yellow House .• That, after th~;' questioned me for an hour to an hour and a half. they then drove me back to my house. During the drive home they gave me a business card with gold lettering on it. I have misplaced that ':8«1. They (old me (0 call if I decided to work for them on the Yellow House case. They offered me $50.00 for each time I would be willing to attempt t? se]1 stolen items to the Yellow House,
•
1.
Untitled
Page 20 of 20
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE [Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2] counsel of record 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this6th day of July 2010. Respectfully submitted,
c.~e~~·
Defendant [l} / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Governments
Response to Defendant
[1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 10
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 1 of 12
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff, v. Case No: 07-20073-CM
07-20t24-CM 08-20tOS-eM CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDNAT HI'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT [lJ'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE WITNESSES
COMES NOW on this
&th
day of July 2010, the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant,
is filing a Reply to the Plaintiffs Response to the Defendant [l]'s Motion to Exclude Witnesses. The Reply is as follows: 1.) In,-r 1, The Plaintiff states that "defendant's motion is without merit and should be denied in its entirety because rule 408 does not apply in criminal proceedings. However Defendant [1] asserts that the Plaintiffs reliance on that claim is misplaced." When in actuality the Defendant [1] can show that the Plaintiffs is both intentionally misleading, as well as, inaccurate in her statement before the court. Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 2 of 12
a). See Ref: The Fifth Circuit has held rule 408 applies in both civil and criminal proceedings. See United States v. Hays, 872 F2d 582,588-89 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that
Rule 408 applies in a criminal proceeding as well as a civil proceeding to bar The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit evidence of a settlement agreement) Rule 408 may apply in a criminal proceeding. b). See also: United States v. Skeddle, 176 FR.D. 254, 256 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (disagreeing with government's argument that Rule 408 does not apply in criminal proceedings, noting that H[n]othing in Rule 408 limits its application to civil litigation that was preceded by or included settlement negotiations'') and State v. Gano, 92 Hawai'i 161, 988 P.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Haw.1999) (discussing cases and concluding that "Rule 408 does apply in criminal proceedings ''). 2). Also note for the record, that the plaintiff has also intentionally left out 408 (b), in which states, "Permitted uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a) Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation." In which is so in this cause of action, whereby, this would not only disprove the Plaintiffs theory but assist the Defendant [1] in her ability to use Rule 408. a). The Government also states: "Clearly Rule 408 does not bar evidence of offers of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony or substantial assistance within the meaning of USSG § 5K1.1", in which states: "The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include ... the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant. "Id. at § 5K1.1 (a),(2). suggested in dicta that
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 3 of 12
Defendant [1] asserts that the provision of this law authorizes only that substantial assistance can be rewarded after it is rendered; It in no way authorizes the government to make a deal for testimony before it is given, as the Government has clearly done in this case. Consequently this statute cannot justify the government's deals with the witnesses in this case before the court. 3.) The Government claim's is that "No practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness ..... testify under a plea bargain that promises him a reduced sentence." Once again the plaintiff had intentionally left out the rest of United States v. Singleton, 165 F. 3d 1297, 1301 (1oth Or. 1999) in which states, "This ingrained practice of buying testimony indicates that suppression is necessary to compel respect for the statutory protections Congress has placed around testimony in federal courts. Exclusion is also necessary to remove the incentive to disregard the statute. See [Calandra, 414 Us. at 347 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 Us. 206, 217 (1960) (quoting US v. Singleton)]. "The benefits of deterrence outweigh the evil of excluding relevant evidence, and the balance falls heavily in favor of suppression". a.) The Government goes on to say that "Furthermore the weighing of evidence, the reconciliation of inconsistent testimony, and the assessment of a witness' credibility is solely within the province of the jury." b.) The Government claims that defendants motion provides no grounds for the exclusion of witness testimony and that the credibility to be accorded to any of the witnesses in these cases is clearly with the sole province of the jury and the defendants request for pretrial exclusion of
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 4 of 12
evidence on the ground that the agreements made between the Government and the witnesses have rendered their testimony unreliable is without foundation in fact or in law. The Defendant [1] disagrees, see ref: "The promise of intangible benefits imports as great a threat to a witness's truthfulness as a cash payment. " See [United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F 2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)] (lilt is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence .... "), cert. denied, 484
u.s. 1026
(1988); Schwartz, 785 F2d
at 680 ("A violation of trust which is influenced by the offer of an intangible service is no less damaging ... than if the influence was in the form of a cash kickback. "); United States v. Meinster, 619 F2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) ("We think it obvious that promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case. "); see also United States v. Kimble, 719 F2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating witness "admitted lying in over thirty different statements motivated by his sense of selfpreservation" under plea arrangement requiring his testimony in return for lenient sentence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). 4.) Government claims that several cooperating witnesses and an undercover police officer are expected to testify that they informed the defendant that the items that they were offering to sell defendant were stolen. The Defendant [1] asserts that the items sold by the undercover officer were indeed not stolen. Nor did the Officer state that his items were "stolen Property." Defendant is prepared to show proof to the court that indeed the Defendant did directly question the undercover officer about whether the items were stolen, and that parts of the conversation that would be exculpatory for the Defendant have been edited from the Audio of the video. Tainted testimony as to any direct conversations between defendant [1] and non-credible witnesses bribed by the
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
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Filed 07/06/10
Page 5 of 12
Government should be inadmissible as hearsay and has no place before ajury. The district court must at least make preliminary factual findings on the record regarding the admissibility of the statements. See United States v. Perez, 989 F2d 1574,1580 (lOth Cir. 1993) (en bane). 5.) The Government states that the issue ofthe credibility to be accorded to any of the witnesses in these cases is clearly within the sole province of the jury and the defendant's request for pretrial exclusion of evidence on the ground that the agreements made between the government and the witnesses have rendered their testimony unreliable is without foundation in fact or law. a). The Defendant [1] states that the witnesses in this case before this court clearly fall within the "Exclusionary Rule." "The principal reason behind the adoption of the exclusionary rule was the Government's failure to observe its own laws. " United States v. Russell, 411 Us. 423, 430 (1973) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 Us. 643, 659 (1961)). The exclusionary rule has been applied to constitutional, statutory, and procedural rule violations to deter unlawful conduct. See United States v. Blue, 384 Us. 251, 255 (l966). b). If the Governments Assistant U.S. Attorneys were to be allowed to present tainted witnesses before a Federal Jury the U.S. Attorneys would clearly be in violation of Kansas Professional Rule 3.4(b). Because clearly the promise ofleniency, years of freedom after a Federal conviction and sentencing, or not having serious charges added to an indictment are all an incentive to lie. The rule, adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas, provides, "A lawyer shall not ... offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b) (1997). This court must exclude any and all of the witnesses, due to the fact they have been tainted, in this case before this court, because clearly their testimony would be unreliable. Agreements to seek leniency, allow freedom after bond violations and Federal crime
Reply to Governments
Response to Defendant
[1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 5
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 6 of 12
conviction, or refrain from filing charges in return for testimony are entered into with the intention of presenting to a court the testimony so acquired. Excluding that tainted testimony removes the sole purpose of the unlawful conduct and leaves no incentive to violate § 201 ©(2). Cf. id. See Ref: USA v. Singleton (lOth cir. 1999) Courts will not be made party to lawlessness by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of illegality. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 (1968); Mapp, 367
u.s.
1, 12-13
u.s. at 660."But
we have found no case in which prosecutors, in their role as
lawyers representing the government after the initiation of criminal proceedings, have been granted a justification to violate generally applicable laws. " See United States v. Ryans, 903 F 2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir.) (Holding that disciplinary rule applies to prosecutors upon commencement of criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990). c.) The United states submits that the Government will be able to establish the defendant's "habitual pattern" of purchasing new, in the box items from regular customers at prices far below retail, allowing the reasonable inference to be drawn by the fact-finders that the defendant knew or should have known that the items she was buying were stolen had she not deliberately closed her eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to her. d). The Government has presented no evidence to substantiate the claim that Defendant [1] had any knowledge that any of the items were stolen. Nor can a witness testify as to the state of mind of Defendant [1]. As most of the witnesses did not even know Defendants [1]'s name. The Government has already stated that the newer or new items brought in by sellers were purchased by the Defendant [1] at 50-80% of the retail value, (which is nowhere near "far below retail.)" All items purchased by the business were paid for by check. There is no evidence to establish the items were stolen, or that the Defendant would have knowledge of such, there were no theft reports or victims on file with the Lawrence Police Dept. connected to Defendant [1] or
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 7 of 12
[2] or the Business; Yellow House Quality Used Appliances Incorporated, search warrants.
at the time of the first
6.) The Defendant [1] however argues the Government has overstepped its bounds, and made a mockery of what Congress had intended when allowing for testimony under plea deals. See witness interrogation; (Parsons Video interrogation interviews, (Video 01)(R -1) Thurs. Oct. 12, 2006) And Parsons Interview 01(Camera 1) Thurs Oct. 19,2006.)) This witness is a
convicted felon caught in possession of3 firearms, sold an AK-47 Assault rifle, Narcotics and stolen property to an undercover officer and was not charged for the crimes in exchange for his agreement to testify that he conspired to conceal the conspiracy in the property case against Defendant [1]. To meet the ends of Justice for his promised testimony Mr. Parsons along with other witnesses have pled guilty to Federal crimes, have already been sentenced to Federal Prison, yet remain free, and have continued to flaunt the law with criminal acts while free on bond as payment for their promised testimony. Our Government is like the King. It demands respect from the people beneath it, it teaches people by its own example. If our Government condones people to break laws, then its people will have no respect for its law. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law "the end justifies the means" would mean this Court condones that this Government allows criminal acts in order to secure the conviction of a criminal would be a Perversion of everything our Forefathers stood for and our Country's soldiers have died for. Reply on the Footnote #2: Footnote 2) The Government states that the defendant's claim that the government has "offered money to its witnesses to manufacture a case" (doc. 227 at P 5) is incorrect. The Defendant asserts that this is an attempt by the Government to mislead the court. The Defendant [1] has
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 7
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 8 of 12
been informed by a number of witnesses that money was offered to them by the Government in exchange for their participation in the manufacturing of this case. [See ref Attach 1] a).Laura claims in her affidavit that someone within the Federal Bureau of Investigation offered her money to assist in the manufacturing of this case, in which is in violation ofFRE § 609 (a) (1) & (2), as well as, FRE Rule 408 (b) . . "We must balance the good of preventing future unlawful conduct with the evil of disallowing relevant evidence of guilt in an individual case". See United States v. Duchi, 944 F 2d, 391, 396 (8th Or. 1991). b). "To permit this unlawfully obtained evidence "to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law." United States v. Mitchell, 322 Us. 65, 67 (1944) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 Us. 332, 345 (1943). Whereby the Defendant [1] is correct in her Motion to Exclude Witnesses, in which need to be either suppressed or excluded. [See ref Attachment 1- Affidavit of Laura Helm dated 04/22/06] The Defendant [1] has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses should be excluded due to the Plaintiffs intentional misrepresentation before this tribunal.
THEREFORE the Defendant [1] is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [l]'s Motion to Exclude Witnesses. Wherefore for all the reasons set forth in the above referenced Reply, the Defendant [1] respectfully requests that the court deny the Governments response and exclude all witnesses pursuant to FRE § 609 (a) (I) & (2), as well as, FRE Rule 408 (b).
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 8
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 9 of 12
Respectfully submitted,
ca~~Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Governments Response to Defendant [1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 9
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 172
Filed 07/06/10
Page 10 of 12
/
WOOD INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, INC.
:"FFIDA VIT
1. Laura Helm. oflawful
age. being fully sworn upon oath, states;
That. in early March 2006. I was contacted by two men while I was staying at my brother's fRay Mayberry'} residence Ioested at 2200 Harper. C-44 Lawrence. Ks, I am unsure of the date. but I do recall it was several weeksago and it was during the week. (
believe. but 1 am not certain. that the date these two men contacted was March 6. !006 between 9:00 a.m .• 10:00 a.m. and interviewed me
Th;ll. these two men. approached my residence and asked (0 speak with me. 1can best describe the first man as a w/m. 5'05". a little belly and short spiky blonde hair. This man did most of the talking during our contact. He said his name. which ( do not
recall. and 'laid Ihey worked with the "Federal Bureau of Investigation." He did not say '. 3\ .1f\1~he ~tlid ,n.: entire bureau name, The second rnan was a w/m. short dark hair.
0'0" and a bigger build than the first man. The second man did Dot say much. The second man did tell me I was not in trouble. but Guy and Carrie Neighbors were. Both men were similarty dressed in slacks and shins. They both wore a badge on their belts and had guns in holsters made of light color leather that was also worn on their waist.
Ther, the first man told me r "had to talk to them." I asked him ifit "had to be today:' He said it did not have to be today and they agreed \0 come back the following dav These ,\m,"e~ retuned th.: ~le}(l ,iay imJ pick c me up in 'I ·jark Hue '1 'v !~r.'~' "j vemcle. ~Jtd not want ttl go with them. but feit trom the way they were acting that ( did not have ~I choice. They drove me to the Lawrence Police Department at 11,h and Massachusetts Street. Lawrence, KS, We went inside the building through an outside door. , n't'all the men entering in a :J15S code to the interior dOM that allowed us inside the police JepilClTTlCnl. '"Ye went into an interview room where both men talked to me. Thev ques(loned me about irerns I haLl sold to the Yellow House in the past. Thev told me ;hey okained my nome through checks that were written by the Yellow House .• That, after th~;' questioned me for an hour to an hour and a half. they then drove me back to my house. During the drive home they gave me a business card with gold lettering on it. I have misplaced that ':8«1. They (old me (0 call if I decided to work for them on the Yellow House case. They offered me $50.00 for each time I would be willing to attempt t? se]1 stolen items to the Yellow House,
•
1.
Untitled
Page 20 of 20
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE [Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2] counsel of record 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this6th day of July 2010. Respectfully submitted,
c.~e~~·
Defendant [l} / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Governments
Response to Defendant
[1] Motion to Exclude Witnesses
Page 10
Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
07912297385
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 1 of 6
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [1} / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff v. Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20124-CM OS-20t05-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDNAT [IrS REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT [IJ'S MOTION TO DISMISS ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE COMES NOW on this 6th day of July 2010, the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant,
is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [I]'s Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence. The Reply is as follows: 1). The Defendant [1] requests that the court take judicial notice that the Plaintiff had failed to specifically raise any objections in reference to the allegations by Defendant [1] as to police mishandling of evidence, destruction of evidence, failure to follow police procedures as to record a true and accurate document ofthe events during the investigation, or perjury, the affidavits were too vague for a warrant to be issued, as shown in the Defendant [1]'s Motion to
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 2 of 6
dismiss evidence, whereby the Defendant [1] has proven by the undisputed facts that any and all evidence should be dismissed by order of this court. 2). In [Doc 257, , 3] the Plaintiff admits that the Plaintiff does not have a chain of custody, and did not have enough evidence to pursue an affidavit for a warrant, but will show at trial enough proof. First this presents a post facto (after the fact) situation, and second it violates the constitution and due process rights of the accused prior to the warrant being served. a.) The Affidavit for the warrant was improper, it failed to show any direct connection of criminal activity to the defendant [1] or her property, or others who were allegedly committing crimes outside of the defendant's knowledge or control. b.) The affidavit provides voluminous details of the alleged criminal activities of other individuals but fails to show why the criminal activity of others would justify a warrant to be served upon Defendant [1], and some of the incidents cited by affiant in the affidavit were in actuality exculpatory in nature. c.) Whereby it was insufficient grounds to apply for a proper search warrant. Therefore the Affidavit fails to meet the criteria or elements needed to secure a proper search warrant. 3.) "The Government submits that at the time of the trial it will establish, through officers who executed the search warrants and inventoried the items, the foundation for the admissibility of each exhibit, including chain of custody for each .... " As prior testimony by the Officers has already established, the evidence seized from the defendant [were] mishandled, not properly documented or logged into evidence, or destroyed by the same officers the Government makes reference to. The evidence logs have been altered with handwritten notes and additions, the Federal evidence the Government wants to present in this case before this court was not properly
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 3 of 6
documented with serial numbers or identification through the Bates system, items appearing in photo affidavits as [stolen] property returned to [rightful owner] cannot be found in evidence logs or photos. The Plaintiff states: ''Although the defendant seems to assert that in order to properly establish the chain of custody the items should be Bates stamped, she fails to cite to and the government cannot locate any legal authority for that claim. " In contrast to the Governments claim see referenced case in which the Judge required the Bates-numerical system be used. [US. v. Michael John O'Keefe, 537 F.Supp.2d 14 (2008)J "A piece of paper or electronically stored
information, without any indication of its creator, source, or custodian may not be authenticated
under Federal Rule of Evidence. " Federal evidence being held pending a Federal investigation by the Lawrence Police Dept., has been randomly given away to "alleged" victims, by the LKPD police officers who originally seized the items, (not Federal agents as mandated by law) absent any kind of hearing before a judge to establish rightful ownership, absent prior theft reports, without verification the item did indeed belong to the alleged victim, missing the mandatory photo affidavits or Identification documentation of the alleged victims, as required by LKPD policy and procedures for return of evidence. Whereby there is no way to verify the items seized from the business or home, are the same items referenced to in the evidence logs, are the same items in the evidence locker today, would be the same items brought before this court as evidence. The Plaintiff states, that although there is no proper chain of custody to protect the integrity of the evidence or this case, [Doc 257 ~ 3] "Through the testimony of the seizing officers, the government will establish the foundation necessary for the admission of these non-fungible exhibits. " 4). The requirement of authentication or identification is a condition precedent to admissibility. "If proffered evidence is unique, readily identifiable, and relatively resistant to
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 4 of 6
change, the foundation need only consist of testimony confirming its relevance. It is when the evidence is susceptible to alteration that the trial court requires a more stringent foundation, entailing a chain of custody of the item and sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or has been subjected to tampering or contamination"] US v. Cardenas 864 F.2d 1528, 1531 (ldh Cir. 1989)]
5). Due to the (2) officers testimony the evidence was susceptible to alteration, in which the trial court requires a more stringent foundation, entailing a chain of custody, in which also during the Federal Case, in which law requires any and all evidence be documented by the bates system, in which was not done in this cause of action, " ... the burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate to the court that it is reasonably probably or reasonably certain that no tampering, alteration, or substitution has occurred "[See ref
us v. Ortiz, 966 F 2d 707(rt
Cir. 1992)].
Since the evidence was not properly documented, evidence logs have been altered, serial numbers were not documented and or changed, procedures were not followed, the Government will not be able to meet the burden of proof in this case before this court. Whereby the chain of custody has been broken, may not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence, which requires the Defendant [1] now must pray the court order dismissal of any and all evidence for the above referenced reasons. [US. v. Michael John O'Keefe, 537 F.Supp.2d 14 (2008)] JOHN M FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge: "In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts can look for guidance in determining whether the production of documents by the government has been in aform or format that is appropriate. This may be because the "big paper" case is the exception rather than the rule in criminal cases. Be that as it may, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure speakspecijica/ly to theform of production. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their present form are the product of nearly 70 years of use and have been consistently amended by advisory committees consisting of judges, practitioners, and distinguished academics to meet
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 5 of 6
perceived deficiencies. It isfoolish to disregard them merely because this is a criminal case, particularly where, as is the case here, it isfar better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same
problems."
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant, is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [1]'s Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence, due to the vague affidavits, as well as, failure to comply with the unalterable Bates-numbering System and PRA YS the court Dismiss any and all evidence for the chain of custody being broken, and failing to document the evidence properly, as Federal Law Mandates.
Respectfully submitted,
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
LL~
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 5
Case 2:01-cr-200/3-CIVI
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel of record 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this6th day of July 2010. Respectfully submitted,
Carrie ei hbors Defendant [1]/ Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants
Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 6
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 1 of 6
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [1} / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff v. Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20124-CM OS-20t05-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDNAT [IrS REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANT [IJ'S MOTION TO DISMISS ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE COMES NOW on this 6th day of July 2010, the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant,
is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [I]'s Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence. The Reply is as follows: 1). The Defendant [1] requests that the court take judicial notice that the Plaintiff had failed to specifically raise any objections in reference to the allegations by Defendant [1] as to police mishandling of evidence, destruction of evidence, failure to follow police procedures as to record a true and accurate document ofthe events during the investigation, or perjury, the affidavits were too vague for a warrant to be issued, as shown in the Defendant [1]'s Motion to
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 1
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 2 of 6
dismiss evidence, whereby the Defendant [1] has proven by the undisputed facts that any and all evidence should be dismissed by order of this court. 2). In [Doc 257, , 3] the Plaintiff admits that the Plaintiff does not have a chain of custody, and did not have enough evidence to pursue an affidavit for a warrant, but will show at trial enough proof. First this presents a post facto (after the fact) situation, and second it violates the constitution and due process rights of the accused prior to the warrant being served. a.) The Affidavit for the warrant was improper, it failed to show any direct connection of criminal activity to the defendant [1] or her property, or others who were allegedly committing crimes outside of the defendant's knowledge or control. b.) The affidavit provides voluminous details of the alleged criminal activities of other individuals but fails to show why the criminal activity of others would justify a warrant to be served upon Defendant [1], and some of the incidents cited by affiant in the affidavit were in actuality exculpatory in nature. c.) Whereby it was insufficient grounds to apply for a proper search warrant. Therefore the Affidavit fails to meet the criteria or elements needed to secure a proper search warrant. 3.) "The Government submits that at the time of the trial it will establish, through officers who executed the search warrants and inventoried the items, the foundation for the admissibility of each exhibit, including chain of custody for each .... " As prior testimony by the Officers has already established, the evidence seized from the defendant [were] mishandled, not properly documented or logged into evidence, or destroyed by the same officers the Government makes reference to. The evidence logs have been altered with handwritten notes and additions, the Federal evidence the Government wants to present in this case before this court was not properly
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 2
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 3 of 6
documented with serial numbers or identification through the Bates system, items appearing in photo affidavits as [stolen] property returned to [rightful owner] cannot be found in evidence logs or photos. The Plaintiff states: ''Although the defendant seems to assert that in order to properly establish the chain of custody the items should be Bates stamped, she fails to cite to and the government cannot locate any legal authority for that claim. " In contrast to the Governments claim see referenced case in which the Judge required the Bates-numerical system be used. [US. v. Michael John O'Keefe, 537 F.Supp.2d 14 (2008)J "A piece of paper or electronically stored
information, without any indication of its creator, source, or custodian may not be authenticated
under Federal Rule of Evidence. " Federal evidence being held pending a Federal investigation by the Lawrence Police Dept., has been randomly given away to "alleged" victims, by the LKPD police officers who originally seized the items, (not Federal agents as mandated by law) absent any kind of hearing before a judge to establish rightful ownership, absent prior theft reports, without verification the item did indeed belong to the alleged victim, missing the mandatory photo affidavits or Identification documentation of the alleged victims, as required by LKPD policy and procedures for return of evidence. Whereby there is no way to verify the items seized from the business or home, are the same items referenced to in the evidence logs, are the same items in the evidence locker today, would be the same items brought before this court as evidence. The Plaintiff states, that although there is no proper chain of custody to protect the integrity of the evidence or this case, [Doc 257 ~ 3] "Through the testimony of the seizing officers, the government will establish the foundation necessary for the admission of these non-fungible exhibits. " 4). The requirement of authentication or identification is a condition precedent to admissibility. "If proffered evidence is unique, readily identifiable, and relatively resistant to
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 3
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 4 of 6
change, the foundation need only consist of testimony confirming its relevance. It is when the evidence is susceptible to alteration that the trial court requires a more stringent foundation, entailing a chain of custody of the item and sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or has been subjected to tampering or contamination"] US v. Cardenas 864 F.2d 1528, 1531 (ldh Cir. 1989)]
5). Due to the (2) officers testimony the evidence was susceptible to alteration, in which the trial court requires a more stringent foundation, entailing a chain of custody, in which also during the Federal Case, in which law requires any and all evidence be documented by the bates system, in which was not done in this cause of action, " ... the burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate to the court that it is reasonably probably or reasonably certain that no tampering, alteration, or substitution has occurred "[See ref
us v. Ortiz, 966 F 2d 707(rt
Cir. 1992)].
Since the evidence was not properly documented, evidence logs have been altered, serial numbers were not documented and or changed, procedures were not followed, the Government will not be able to meet the burden of proof in this case before this court. Whereby the chain of custody has been broken, may not be authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence, which requires the Defendant [1] now must pray the court order dismissal of any and all evidence for the above referenced reasons. [US. v. Michael John O'Keefe, 537 F.Supp.2d 14 (2008)] JOHN M FACCIOLA, United States Magistrate Judge: "In criminal cases, there is unfortunately no rule to which the courts can look for guidance in determining whether the production of documents by the government has been in aform or format that is appropriate. This may be because the "big paper" case is the exception rather than the rule in criminal cases. Be that as it may, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure speakspecijica/ly to theform of production. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their present form are the product of nearly 70 years of use and have been consistently amended by advisory committees consisting of judges, practitioners, and distinguished academics to meet
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence Page 4
Case 2:07-cr-20073-CM
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 5 of 6
perceived deficiencies. It isfoolish to disregard them merely because this is a criminal case, particularly where, as is the case here, it isfar better to use these rules than to reinvent the wheel when the production of documents in criminal and civil cases raises the same
problems."
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], acting as a pro se litigant, is filing a Reply to the Plaintiff's Response to the Defendant [1]'s Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence, due to the vague affidavits, as well as, failure to comply with the unalterable Bates-numbering System and PRA YS the court Dismiss any and all evidence for the chain of custody being broken, and failing to document the evidence properly, as Federal Law Mandates.
Respectfully submitted,
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [I] / Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
LL~
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 5
Case 2:01-cr-200/3-CIVI
Document 173
Filed 07/06/10
Page 6 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defendant [2J counsel of record 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this6th day of July 2010. Respectfully submitted,
Carrie ei hbors Defendant [1]/ Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Defendants
Motion to Dismiss any and all Evidence
Page 6
Thursday, June 24, 2010
DEFENDANT (1)'S MOTION TO QUASH THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR UNDER SEAL. AS TO DEFENDANT (1) [Pursuant to 18 USC § 3771]
6-23-2010_07912287374
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 1 of 3
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [1J I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence. Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
:. ~1. t
~.
n ::
.~'
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 07·20073-CM 07-20124-CM OS-2010S-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDANT (1)'S MOTION TO QUASH THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR UNDER SEAL. AS TO DEFENDANT (1)
[Pursuant to 18 USC § 3771]
COMES NOW on this 23 th day of June 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting
as a pro se litigant is filing a Motion to Quash the Plaintiffs Motion for Under Seal as to Defendant [1], filed on 06/22/2010, pursuant to 18 USC§ 3771. The Motion is as follows: 1). This motion is a kitchen sink motion, in which fails to specifically identify why this Motion for under seal is needed, at this point and time. Whereby, it should be quashed. 2). The Defendant [1] has a right pursuant to18 USC § 3771 not to be excluded from any court proceeding, as well as, the right from unreasonable delay, in which is not so in this matter.
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 1
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 2 of 3
3). Pursuant to President Obama's Memorandum on Transparency, this case should not be allowed to be placed under seal, due to the public has a right to know after the government had spent all the taxpayers monies on attempting to prosecute a case way beyond the statute of time limitations. Now, that the Defendant [1] had raised the proper motions and the government has failed within due diligence, to prosecute in a timely manner. the government now wants to conceal from the public the errors they have committed within this case. 4). This case was not concealed against the Defendant when the government had publicized this case on 12117/2009, even after the court ordered it not to be publicized, whereby stating it in layman's terms when it only benefits the Plaintiff, or government in this matter. Whereby, this now violates the rights of the accused to either defend or challenge the evidence or witnesses against her in a criminal prosecution, now that she is her own attorney. This is holding her to a heightened standard, as well as, confirms that she is denied equal access to justice. This is absurd at this point and time.
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant is filing a Motion to Quash the Plaintiffs Motion for Under Seal as to Defendant [1], filed on 06/22/2010, pursuant to 18 USC§ 3771, and PRAYS the Court Quash the Plaintiffs Motion to place this matter under seal as to Defendant [1] for the above referenced merits. Respectfully submitted.
/J
Carrie Neigh 0 Defendant [1 I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 2
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docwnent in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, fIrSt class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC
Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord
142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this 23 rd day of June 2010. Respectfully submitted,
cQ[;;;J
Defendant [IJ I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 3
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 1 of 3
Carrie Neighbors
Defendant [1J I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence. Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
:. ~1. t
~.
n ::
.~'
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 07·20073-CM 07-20124-CM OS-2010S-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
DEFENDANT (1)'S MOTION TO QUASH THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR UNDER SEAL. AS TO DEFENDANT (1)
[Pursuant to 18 USC § 3771]
COMES NOW on this 23 th day of June 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting
as a pro se litigant is filing a Motion to Quash the Plaintiffs Motion for Under Seal as to Defendant [1], filed on 06/22/2010, pursuant to 18 USC§ 3771. The Motion is as follows: 1). This motion is a kitchen sink motion, in which fails to specifically identify why this Motion for under seal is needed, at this point and time. Whereby, it should be quashed. 2). The Defendant [1] has a right pursuant to18 USC § 3771 not to be excluded from any court proceeding, as well as, the right from unreasonable delay, in which is not so in this matter.
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 1
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 2 of 3
3). Pursuant to President Obama's Memorandum on Transparency, this case should not be allowed to be placed under seal, due to the public has a right to know after the government had spent all the taxpayers monies on attempting to prosecute a case way beyond the statute of time limitations. Now, that the Defendant [1] had raised the proper motions and the government has failed within due diligence, to prosecute in a timely manner. the government now wants to conceal from the public the errors they have committed within this case. 4). This case was not concealed against the Defendant when the government had publicized this case on 12117/2009, even after the court ordered it not to be publicized, whereby stating it in layman's terms when it only benefits the Plaintiff, or government in this matter. Whereby, this now violates the rights of the accused to either defend or challenge the evidence or witnesses against her in a criminal prosecution, now that she is her own attorney. This is holding her to a heightened standard, as well as, confirms that she is denied equal access to justice. This is absurd at this point and time.
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant is filing a Motion to Quash the Plaintiffs Motion for Under Seal as to Defendant [1], filed on 06/22/2010, pursuant to 18 USC§ 3771, and PRAYS the Court Quash the Plaintiffs Motion to place this matter under seal as to Defendant [1] for the above referenced merits. Respectfully submitted.
/J
Carrie Neigh 0 Defendant [1 I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 2
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 107
Filed 06/23/10 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing docwnent in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, fIrSt class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC
Defendant [2J counsel ofrecord
142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this 23 rd day of June 2010. Respectfully submitted,
cQ[;;;J
Defendant [IJ I Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
Motion to Quash the Motion for Under Seal as to Carrie Neighbors
Page 3
MOTION TO DENY PLAINTIFF ADDITIONAL TIME TO RESPOND
6-23-2010_07912287356
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 1 of 4
\
...
.
~;
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [IJ / Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20124-CM 08-2010S-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
MOTION TO DENY PLAINTIFF ADDITIONAL TIME TO RESPOND
COMES NOW on this 23th day of June 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting
as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion to Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions. The Motion to Deny Additional Time is as follows: 1). The Defendant [1] is under the belief that the government is out of order to either request a continuance, or request additional time, when the court had extended the time to June 28th 2010, and it now gives the appearance of undue delay and prejudices the case. 2). If the government was concerned it would not have had the prosecuting attorney take a vacation, in which she recently was on, in which was another 30 day delay, and during that time no attempt was made to obtain the transcripts, nor did the government appoint another
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 1
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 2 of 4
attorney to handle the case. Whereby, the government once again has exhausted their request for any other continuances or additional time at this point, in which the court should not allow any further continuances or delays in this matter, when the court already extended the courtesy and allowed the Plaintiff until the 28th ofJune 20 I O. Title I of the Speedy Tria I Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080,
as amended August 2,1979,93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.c. §§ 3161-3174.
2). The Defendant [1] has estimated there was 4 days left on the speedy trial clock when the first case was dismissed. Since then, (not inclusive of the first case) in which was a continuance of the first indictment. [see ref Doc 2 ~ 3] Then on 06/20/07 ofthe second indictment was filed, in which an estimate of 785 days have been excluded from the speedy trial clock, on a case that the speedy trial clock already had tolled within 4 days of the subsequent indictment, in which the record would show that the time had already expired. Title I of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974,88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979,93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
3). The time limitations had already had expired prior to the case being designated as a complex case. Whereby we would request the court take judicial notice of [Doc 2 ~ 3] in the record and rule accordingly, as the Defendant [1] had already pointed out in [Doc 141]. 4). The Defendant [1] is uncertain why the Plaintiff needs the transcripts to respond to the motions in question when the order will suffice, unless the Plaintiff is contradicting the courts order, then the Defendant [1] objects, due to the Plaintiff should have filed an appeal, not challenge the courts decision this late in these proceedings. The Defendant can show due to the Plaintiffs tactics delay on the Defendant [I] was minimal, but only by cause of the prosecution, whereby this delay for additional time should not be allowed. 5). The number of high volume of cases pending in the court is insufficient to justify the delay. [See refMcClellan v. Young, 421 F. 2d at 691] [See ref Doc 143 ~ 2]
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request PageZ
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 3 of 4
6). General congestion of a courts calendar is impennissible factor on which to base ends ofjustice continuance under Speedy Trial Act. 18 USC § 3161(h)(8)(C). cert denied, 456 U.S. 918, 102 S.Ct. 1776, L.Ed.2d 179 (1982). [See ref Doc 143 ~P] 7). The Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 6.1 (a) [See ref USDC ofKansas case No.
09-3075 JAR, Geoffrey L. Rashaw-Bey v. Ricardo Carrizales, et al., Memorandum and Order dated 0412612010]
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion to Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions, and PRAYS the court Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions for the above referenced or aforementioned reasons.
Respectfully submitted,
Carrie Neighbo Deftndant [lJ 1 Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
La
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 3
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defondant [2] counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this 23rd day of June 2010. Respectfully submitted,
c(!£.l
Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842·2785
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 4
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 1 of 4
\
...
.
~;
Carrie Neighbors Defendant [IJ / Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 07-20073-CM 07-20124-CM 08-2010S-CM
CARRIE NEIGHBORS,
Defendant 1,
GUY M. NEIGHBORS
Defendant 2,
MOTION TO DENY PLAINTIFF ADDITIONAL TIME TO RESPOND
COMES NOW on this 23th day of June 2010, the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting
as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion to Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions. The Motion to Deny Additional Time is as follows: 1). The Defendant [1] is under the belief that the government is out of order to either request a continuance, or request additional time, when the court had extended the time to June 28th 2010, and it now gives the appearance of undue delay and prejudices the case. 2). If the government was concerned it would not have had the prosecuting attorney take a vacation, in which she recently was on, in which was another 30 day delay, and during that time no attempt was made to obtain the transcripts, nor did the government appoint another
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 1
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 2 of 4
attorney to handle the case. Whereby, the government once again has exhausted their request for any other continuances or additional time at this point, in which the court should not allow any further continuances or delays in this matter, when the court already extended the courtesy and allowed the Plaintiff until the 28th ofJune 20 I O. Title I of the Speedy Tria I Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2080,
as amended August 2,1979,93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.c. §§ 3161-3174.
2). The Defendant [1] has estimated there was 4 days left on the speedy trial clock when the first case was dismissed. Since then, (not inclusive of the first case) in which was a continuance of the first indictment. [see ref Doc 2 ~ 3] Then on 06/20/07 ofthe second indictment was filed, in which an estimate of 785 days have been excluded from the speedy trial clock, on a case that the speedy trial clock already had tolled within 4 days of the subsequent indictment, in which the record would show that the time had already expired. Title I of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974,88 Stat. 2080, as amended August 2, 1979,93 Stat. 328, is set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174.
3). The time limitations had already had expired prior to the case being designated as a complex case. Whereby we would request the court take judicial notice of [Doc 2 ~ 3] in the record and rule accordingly, as the Defendant [1] had already pointed out in [Doc 141]. 4). The Defendant [1] is uncertain why the Plaintiff needs the transcripts to respond to the motions in question when the order will suffice, unless the Plaintiff is contradicting the courts order, then the Defendant [1] objects, due to the Plaintiff should have filed an appeal, not challenge the courts decision this late in these proceedings. The Defendant can show due to the Plaintiffs tactics delay on the Defendant [I] was minimal, but only by cause of the prosecution, whereby this delay for additional time should not be allowed. 5). The number of high volume of cases pending in the court is insufficient to justify the delay. [See refMcClellan v. Young, 421 F. 2d at 691] [See ref Doc 143 ~ 2]
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request PageZ
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 3 of 4
6). General congestion of a courts calendar is impennissible factor on which to base ends ofjustice continuance under Speedy Trial Act. 18 USC § 3161(h)(8)(C). cert denied, 456 U.S. 918, 102 S.Ct. 1776, L.Ed.2d 179 (1982). [See ref Doc 143 ~P] 7). The Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 6.1 (a) [See ref USDC ofKansas case No.
09-3075 JAR, Geoffrey L. Rashaw-Bey v. Ricardo Carrizales, et al., Memorandum and Order dated 0412612010]
THEREFORE the Defendant [1], Carrie Neighbors, acting as a pro se litigant, is filing a Motion to Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions, and PRAYS the court Deny the Plaintiff additional time to Respond to the Defendant [1] 's Motions for the above referenced or aforementioned reasons.
Respectfully submitted,
Carrie Neighbo Deftndant [lJ 1 Pro Se Litigant
1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842-2785
La
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 3
Case 2:08-cr-20105-CM-JPO Document 106
Filed 06/23/10 Page 4 of 4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Pursuant to KSA 60-205] The undersigned also hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the above captioned matter was deposited in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: Cheryl A Pilate Melanie Morgan LLC Defondant [2] counsel ofrecord 142 Cherry Olathe, Kansas 66061
Marietta Parker Terra Morehead U.S. Attorneys 500 State Ave. Suite 360 Kansas City, KS 66101 On this 23rd day of June 2010. Respectfully submitted,
c(!£.l
Defendant [1] / Pro Se Litigant 1104 Andover Lawrence, Kansas 66049 (785) 842·2785
Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Additional Time Request
Page 4
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
government has failed to bring to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial act
Speedy Trial Violation in Yellow house case Order by Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 07-20073-01/01-JWL
Guy Neighbors
and,
Carrie Neighbors,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Mr. Guy S. Neighbors and Ms. Carrie Neighbors (“defendants”) have moved to dismiss
with prejudice one of the criminal charges in a four-count indictment against them on the ground
that the government has failed to bring them to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The government objects.
I. Background
On December 7, 2006, the Neighbors were indicted for being unlawful users of a
controlled substance who knowingly and unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18,
sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), United States Code. The defendants made their first
appearance on December 12, 2006 in case No. 06-20171-CM, which is referred to by this court
as the “first indictment” or “first case.” On January 3, 2007, and February 5, 2007, defendant
Carrie Neighbors filed Motions for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions, which the judge
granted. The excluded time from these motions was also applied to co-defendant Guy
2
Neighbors. On March 26, 2007, the court made a text entry noting that no motions had been
filed, and the jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the
government filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to both defendants based on additional
evidence discovered during the ongoing investigation. The judge sustained the motion on May
10, 2007, dismissing the indictment without prejudice.
On June 20, 2007, the defendants were indicted on four counts, including conspiring to
manufacture marijuana, being unlawful users of a controlled substance who knowingly and
unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18, sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 2”),
and two counts for knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana. The court will refer
to this indictment as the “second indictment.” (Doc. # 1) Defendants appeared before a
magistrate judge on June 25, 2007. On July 17, 2007, defendant Guy Neighbors filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions (Doc. # 16). At a hearing on August 13, 2007,
the court took the Motion for Extension of Time under advisement and granted Guy Neighbors’s
Motion to Withdraw his attorney (Doc. # 18). The Motion for Extension of Time was later
granted on September 10, 2007.
On September 11, 2007, counsel for Carrie Neighbors filed the Motion to Dismiss Count
2 (Doc. # 24) (“Motion”), currently at issue before the court. Guy Neighbors also filed a Motion
to Disclose Expert Testimony (Doc. # 27) on October 15, 2007, which is still pending. At the
evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2007, Guy Neighbors was permitted to join Carrie
Neighbor’s Motion to Dismiss via his Motion to Join Co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. # 28), thereby mooting his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. # 25) that had
3
been filed on September 12, 2007. The Court also took the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 under
advisement, and after thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court grants the Motion
but reserves the determination of whether to grant it with or without prejudice until after an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
II. Analysis
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et. seq., is designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he intent of the Act [is] to balance protection of the accused against society’s interest in
efficient criminal process.”). It “requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within
seventy days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. Certain periods of
delay, outlined in detail in the STA, are excluded and do not count toward the seventy-day
limit.” See id. at 1178, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1)-(9); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1999). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy day
deadline, which is subject to statutory exclusions, “dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v.
Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1989). “The ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant.” Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, quoting United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d
1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)] as extended by
1There apparently was some confusion as to what the defendants were requesting of
the court–to dismiss the entire second indictment or only the one charge found in both the
first and second indictment. Upon inquiry by the court at the hearing, defense counsel
clarified that they were moving only to dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment, which was
the only count in the first indictment.
2“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
4
section 3161(h) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)], the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.”).
A. Whether the time accrued under the first indictment for Speedy Trial Act purposes is
added to the time under the second indictment when the government moved to dismiss the
first indictment
The Neighbors brought a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count 2 of the second
indictment1 under chapter 18, section 3161(c)(1), United States Code, which relates to the
seventy day deadline.2 The Neighbors also cited section 3161(d)(1), but misinterpreted the
language, as did the government.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any
charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or
otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or
individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment
is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
5
18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). Both sides apparently interpreted the language “the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent
complaint, indictment, or information” to mean that the seventy day time period from section
3161(c)(1) would not start anew with the second indictment. This language, however, is
interpreted to mean that when those sections do apply, a new seventy day time period does begin
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The question, then, is whether the provisions of section 3161(d)(1), and therefore a new
time period under section 3161(c)(1), apply when the government files the motion to dismiss the
first indictment. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit provided a clear and concise description of
the relationship between sections 3161(c) and 3161(d)(1):
Under § 3161(d)(1), if an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the defendant
and he is subsequently re-indicted with the same offense, the new indictment
begins a new seventy-day period. See § 3161(c); see also United States v.
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809, n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 183
F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 3161(d)(1) resets the periods in
which a defendant must be indicted and tried.”); United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the “Speedy Trial Act clock starts fresh”
when the defendant moves to dismiss and is reindicted); United States v.
Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant and there is reprosecution, the 70-day period
provided by § 3161(c) begins anew.”). . . .
However, where the government moves to dismiss the indictment . . . and then
refiles a second indictment alleging the same charges, the government does not
get a new seventy-day clock. See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broadwater, 151 F.3d 1359, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the government moves to dismiss a count following a mistrial, it
does not get a ‘fresh clock’ on reindictment; rather, the time is tolled from the
dismissal of the original count until the reindictment.”) (emphasis added); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hoslett,
998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 248 (8th
3The government also made the argument at the hearing that because no challenge was
made at the time the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the defendants should
not now be able to bring this motion to dismiss. This, however, is not the same argument the
defendants now make. There is nothing in a dismissal without prejudice that also means the
government can disregard the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. While the government
was free to indict the defendants with the same charge based upon the “without prejudice”
order, it still had an obligation to do so under the applicable time limits of section 3161(c)(1)
because the government, not the defendant, moved to dismiss the first indictment. The
argument, therefore, has no influence on the fact that the Speedy Trial Act deadline does not
start over when the government is the party that filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment.
6
Cir. 1987) (same). “The reason for this rule is obvious. If the clock began anew,
the government could circumvent the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act by
repeatedly dismissing and refiling charges against a defendant.” Hoslett, 998 F.2d
at 658, n.12; see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463, n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (stating that when the original indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the government “and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense”
the time is tolled between the dismissal of the first indictment and when the time commences for
the subsequent charge, i.e., upon indictment or appearance); United States v. Magana-Olvera,
917 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the first indictment is dismissed on the government’s
motion, the statutory time limit is merely suspended until a new indictment is returned; the
70-day clock is not reset.”). It is clear that when the government moves to dismiss the first
indictment, as was the case here, the Speedy Trial Act clock does not begin anew for the same
charge filed in the second indictment; the time accrued towards the seventy days under the first
indictment is added to the time under the second indictment.3
7
B. Calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act
The court concludes that the time accrued under the first indictment must be combined
with the time under the second indictment, so it is necessary to calculate the time included within
the Speedy Trial Act provisions. For a Speedy Trial Act violation to have occurred, seventy
non-excludable days must have passed since defendants appeared before the judicial officer on
December 12, 2006. “The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
[to dismiss indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act] but the Government shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under [18
U.S.C. §] 3161(h)(3).” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
In the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, the defendants claim that after reviewing the
docket sheet, they determined there were sixty-three days that should be included within the
Speedy Trial Act calculation under the first indictment. The sixty-three day total was determined
based on time between December 7, 2006, the day that the indictment was filed, and May 10,
2007, the day the indictment was dismissed. The first appearance as to the second indictment
was made on June 25, 2007 and Guy Neighbors filed a Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadlines on July 17, 2007. Between these dates, the defendant calculated that twenty-two days
should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculations. Under both indictments, the
defendants’ totals show the number of days as eighty-five. Upon independent review by this
court, according to ECF, fifty-eight days had accrued under the first indictment and twenty-one
days under the second indictment, totaling seventy-nine.
8
The government has the burden of proving any applicable exclusion of time under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The government stated in its motion that twenty-two days had
elapsed under the second indictment, but made no other challenges to the calculations either in
its response to the motion or at the hearing. Whether the defendants’ calculation or the
calculation by ECF is accepted, the seventy day deadline has passed, and the government has
not proven that any other exclusions should apply to extend that time. The court, therefore,
grants the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2);
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“Subject to statutory exclusions, if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the seventy-day deadline, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).
C. Whether the dismissal of the case due to a Speedy Trial Act violation should be with or
without prejudice
Because the seventy day deadline has passed and the court dismisses the indictment on
Count 2, the court must determine whether the charge should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he district court retains broad discretion
whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.”). “In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the
following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Prejudice
to the defendant is among the other factors relevant to the district court’s consideration. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988).
9
At the hearing because the court had not yet resolved whether there was a Speedy Trial
Act violation, little evidence or argument relating to these “with or without prejudice” factors
was presented. Now that the court has determined there has been such a violation and that Count
2 will be dismissed, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether
the count should be dismissed with or without prejudice. The court will take into consideration
evidence and arguments regarding the seriousness of the offense, facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the
Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice, as well as other factors, including the
prejudice suffered by the defendants.
III. Conclusion
In sum the court finds that where the government filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act time period does not start anew. Instead, the time
accrued under the first indictment is added to the accumulated time of the second indictment.
Based on this and the corresponding calculation of time exceeding seventy days, the court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2. The court reserves the ruling of whether to grant the
Motion with or without prejudice until an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Doc.
# 24) is GRANTED, but RESERVES the determination of whether to grant the motion with
or without prejudice until after the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 07-20073-01/01-JWL
Guy Neighbors
and,
Carrie Neighbors,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Mr. Guy S. Neighbors and Ms. Carrie Neighbors (“defendants”) have moved to dismiss
with prejudice one of the criminal charges in a four-count indictment against them on the ground
that the government has failed to bring them to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The government objects.
I. Background
On December 7, 2006, the Neighbors were indicted for being unlawful users of a
controlled substance who knowingly and unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18,
sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), United States Code. The defendants made their first
appearance on December 12, 2006 in case No. 06-20171-CM, which is referred to by this court
as the “first indictment” or “first case.” On January 3, 2007, and February 5, 2007, defendant
Carrie Neighbors filed Motions for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions, which the judge
granted. The excluded time from these motions was also applied to co-defendant Guy
2
Neighbors. On March 26, 2007, the court made a text entry noting that no motions had been
filed, and the jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the
government filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to both defendants based on additional
evidence discovered during the ongoing investigation. The judge sustained the motion on May
10, 2007, dismissing the indictment without prejudice.
On June 20, 2007, the defendants were indicted on four counts, including conspiring to
manufacture marijuana, being unlawful users of a controlled substance who knowingly and
unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18, sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 2”),
and two counts for knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana. The court will refer
to this indictment as the “second indictment.” (Doc. # 1) Defendants appeared before a
magistrate judge on June 25, 2007. On July 17, 2007, defendant Guy Neighbors filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions (Doc. # 16). At a hearing on August 13, 2007,
the court took the Motion for Extension of Time under advisement and granted Guy Neighbors’s
Motion to Withdraw his attorney (Doc. # 18). The Motion for Extension of Time was later
granted on September 10, 2007.
On September 11, 2007, counsel for Carrie Neighbors filed the Motion to Dismiss Count
2 (Doc. # 24) (“Motion”), currently at issue before the court. Guy Neighbors also filed a Motion
to Disclose Expert Testimony (Doc. # 27) on October 15, 2007, which is still pending. At the
evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2007, Guy Neighbors was permitted to join Carrie
Neighbor’s Motion to Dismiss via his Motion to Join Co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. # 28), thereby mooting his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. # 25) that had
3
been filed on September 12, 2007. The Court also took the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 under
advisement, and after thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court grants the Motion
but reserves the determination of whether to grant it with or without prejudice until after an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
II. Analysis
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et. seq., is designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he intent of the Act [is] to balance protection of the accused against society’s interest in
efficient criminal process.”). It “requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within
seventy days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. Certain periods of
delay, outlined in detail in the STA, are excluded and do not count toward the seventy-day
limit.” See id. at 1178, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1)-(9); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1999). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy day
deadline, which is subject to statutory exclusions, “dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v.
Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1989). “The ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant.” Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, quoting United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d
1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)] as extended by
1There apparently was some confusion as to what the defendants were requesting of
the court–to dismiss the entire second indictment or only the one charge found in both the
first and second indictment. Upon inquiry by the court at the hearing, defense counsel
clarified that they were moving only to dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment, which was
the only count in the first indictment.
2“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
4
section 3161(h) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)], the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.”).
A. Whether the time accrued under the first indictment for Speedy Trial Act purposes is
added to the time under the second indictment when the government moved to dismiss the
first indictment
The Neighbors brought a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count 2 of the second
indictment1 under chapter 18, section 3161(c)(1), United States Code, which relates to the
seventy day deadline.2 The Neighbors also cited section 3161(d)(1), but misinterpreted the
language, as did the government.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any
charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or
otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or
individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment
is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
5
18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). Both sides apparently interpreted the language “the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent
complaint, indictment, or information” to mean that the seventy day time period from section
3161(c)(1) would not start anew with the second indictment. This language, however, is
interpreted to mean that when those sections do apply, a new seventy day time period does begin
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The question, then, is whether the provisions of section 3161(d)(1), and therefore a new
time period under section 3161(c)(1), apply when the government files the motion to dismiss the
first indictment. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit provided a clear and concise description of
the relationship between sections 3161(c) and 3161(d)(1):
Under § 3161(d)(1), if an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the defendant
and he is subsequently re-indicted with the same offense, the new indictment
begins a new seventy-day period. See § 3161(c); see also United States v.
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809, n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 183
F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 3161(d)(1) resets the periods in
which a defendant must be indicted and tried.”); United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the “Speedy Trial Act clock starts fresh”
when the defendant moves to dismiss and is reindicted); United States v.
Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant and there is reprosecution, the 70-day period
provided by § 3161(c) begins anew.”). . . .
However, where the government moves to dismiss the indictment . . . and then
refiles a second indictment alleging the same charges, the government does not
get a new seventy-day clock. See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broadwater, 151 F.3d 1359, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the government moves to dismiss a count following a mistrial, it
does not get a ‘fresh clock’ on reindictment; rather, the time is tolled from the
dismissal of the original count until the reindictment.”) (emphasis added); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hoslett,
998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 248 (8th
3The government also made the argument at the hearing that because no challenge was
made at the time the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the defendants should
not now be able to bring this motion to dismiss. This, however, is not the same argument the
defendants now make. There is nothing in a dismissal without prejudice that also means the
government can disregard the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. While the government
was free to indict the defendants with the same charge based upon the “without prejudice”
order, it still had an obligation to do so under the applicable time limits of section 3161(c)(1)
because the government, not the defendant, moved to dismiss the first indictment. The
argument, therefore, has no influence on the fact that the Speedy Trial Act deadline does not
start over when the government is the party that filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment.
6
Cir. 1987) (same). “The reason for this rule is obvious. If the clock began anew,
the government could circumvent the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act by
repeatedly dismissing and refiling charges against a defendant.” Hoslett, 998 F.2d
at 658, n.12; see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463, n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (stating that when the original indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the government “and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense”
the time is tolled between the dismissal of the first indictment and when the time commences for
the subsequent charge, i.e., upon indictment or appearance); United States v. Magana-Olvera,
917 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the first indictment is dismissed on the government’s
motion, the statutory time limit is merely suspended until a new indictment is returned; the
70-day clock is not reset.”). It is clear that when the government moves to dismiss the first
indictment, as was the case here, the Speedy Trial Act clock does not begin anew for the same
charge filed in the second indictment; the time accrued towards the seventy days under the first
indictment is added to the time under the second indictment.3
7
B. Calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act
The court concludes that the time accrued under the first indictment must be combined
with the time under the second indictment, so it is necessary to calculate the time included within
the Speedy Trial Act provisions. For a Speedy Trial Act violation to have occurred, seventy
non-excludable days must have passed since defendants appeared before the judicial officer on
December 12, 2006. “The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
[to dismiss indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act] but the Government shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under [18
U.S.C. §] 3161(h)(3).” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
In the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, the defendants claim that after reviewing the
docket sheet, they determined there were sixty-three days that should be included within the
Speedy Trial Act calculation under the first indictment. The sixty-three day total was determined
based on time between December 7, 2006, the day that the indictment was filed, and May 10,
2007, the day the indictment was dismissed. The first appearance as to the second indictment
was made on June 25, 2007 and Guy Neighbors filed a Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadlines on July 17, 2007. Between these dates, the defendant calculated that twenty-two days
should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculations. Under both indictments, the
defendants’ totals show the number of days as eighty-five. Upon independent review by this
court, according to ECF, fifty-eight days had accrued under the first indictment and twenty-one
days under the second indictment, totaling seventy-nine.
8
The government has the burden of proving any applicable exclusion of time under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The government stated in its motion that twenty-two days had
elapsed under the second indictment, but made no other challenges to the calculations either in
its response to the motion or at the hearing. Whether the defendants’ calculation or the
calculation by ECF is accepted, the seventy day deadline has passed, and the government has
not proven that any other exclusions should apply to extend that time. The court, therefore,
grants the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2);
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“Subject to statutory exclusions, if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the seventy-day deadline, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).
C. Whether the dismissal of the case due to a Speedy Trial Act violation should be with or
without prejudice
Because the seventy day deadline has passed and the court dismisses the indictment on
Count 2, the court must determine whether the charge should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he district court retains broad discretion
whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.”). “In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the
following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Prejudice
to the defendant is among the other factors relevant to the district court’s consideration. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988).
9
At the hearing because the court had not yet resolved whether there was a Speedy Trial
Act violation, little evidence or argument relating to these “with or without prejudice” factors
was presented. Now that the court has determined there has been such a violation and that Count
2 will be dismissed, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether
the count should be dismissed with or without prejudice. The court will take into consideration
evidence and arguments regarding the seriousness of the offense, facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the
Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice, as well as other factors, including the
prejudice suffered by the defendants.
III. Conclusion
In sum the court finds that where the government filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act time period does not start anew. Instead, the time
accrued under the first indictment is added to the accumulated time of the second indictment.
Based on this and the corresponding calculation of time exceeding seventy days, the court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2. The court reserves the ruling of whether to grant the
Motion with or without prejudice until an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Doc.
# 24) is GRANTED, but RESERVES the determination of whether to grant the motion with
or without prejudice until after the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Round 2 of mental Exams.
Carrie and Guy Neighbors have undergone a second round of mental evaluations. This was an attempt by the prosecution to delay the trial date until she can figure out what she is going to do about this Gigantic mess she has created.
The outcomes of the 2nd round of Evaluations is.....
Carrie Neighbors has been found competent for a second time now.
and Guy Neighbors has been found incompetent so he will be medically treated and then re-evaluated in 30 days.
So after they were found competent 7 months ago the prosecutor requested a second round of exams. and no surprise one of the two people did not pass.
What does this mean for the neighbors ???
Well now the trial has been delayed another 120 days so its been delays almost 1/2 a year. So the prosecutor has been successful at delaying the trial even longer. It's already been 5 years now it looks as if this could go on forever.
The outcomes of the 2nd round of Evaluations is.....
Carrie Neighbors has been found competent for a second time now.
and Guy Neighbors has been found incompetent so he will be medically treated and then re-evaluated in 30 days.
So after they were found competent 7 months ago the prosecutor requested a second round of exams. and no surprise one of the two people did not pass.
What does this mean for the neighbors ???
Well now the trial has been delayed another 120 days so its been delays almost 1/2 a year. So the prosecutor has been successful at delaying the trial even longer. It's already been 5 years now it looks as if this could go on forever.
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Images of an innocent man who is wrongfully incarcerated
Here are images of an innocent man who is currently incarcerated in kansas because of emails he sent to the FBI & DOJ (department of justice) in which he complains about a federal prosecutor committing crimes against him. Guy Neighbors is trying to stand up against corruption in the Kansas Department of justice and it is no easy task.
Here is a link to the Ruling in his previous case in which the Federal charges were dismissed by a federal judge. Shortly after the ruling an investigation ensued into the Lawrence police department's possible corruption. Shortly after the investigation into the Lawrence police department started the same federal prosecutor re-indited Guy and Carrie Neighbors on the same charges they were dismissed from a week earlier. This halted the lawrence police department corruption investigation as they could now claim that the investigators where interfering with an ongoing court case and criminal investigation into "the largest fencing operation in Kansas history"- SGT. Dan Ward of Lawrence police department interview in 2006 with the Lawrence journal world.
Case No. 07-20124-01/02-CM Federal Order to Dismiss
Here is a story being done by the Kansan.com In which Guy neighbors was interviewed
Monday, August 10, 2009
The Qwest for the Truth.......
Guy and Carrie Neighbors defense counsel have filed 3-4 motions over the past 5 years to get discovery on what possible evidence the Gov't prosecutor has against the owners of the yellow house store. This is all after the federal charges were dismissed by a federal judge 3 years ago. Each time this request is made the prosecutor's answer is there is too much evidence to show....... yet there still has been no trial and the biggest issue in this case was not crimes committed but Guy Neighbors and his blogging and complaining of no oversight of the LPD and the federal prosecutor and his publicly claiming of innocents. Guy Neighbors is Currently in Prison after the prosecutor Marietta Parker tried 7 times to revoke Guy's Bond and the Reason was because of his blogging and complaining. On the 8th time She claimed he was a danger to the community even though he was not charged with a violent crime. I wonder how this Kansas man could go from a foster parent(over the last 7 years) to a danger to the community ?
Here is a motion asking for the gov't to produce the evidence.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17795127/Kansas-Court-case-07911992855-Lawrence-Police-dept-and-Guy-Neighbors
A response to the first few request to revoke Guy's Bond
http://www.scribd.com/doc/16464489/Response-to-Motion-to-Revoke-Case-No-0720124CM
Here is another motion filed by the Defense, in this motion the defense asks for just the facts to be brought up at trial. They also ask that only the items that can be proven stolen be admissible in court this is huge because the Lawrence police Dept. claimed that Everything Seized was stolen when it was in fact not stolen but to get the case up to a federal level they had to fabricate the amount of 550,000 worth of stolen goods to have the case herd in federal court. The actual amount was $1,300.00 of items that the police staged as being stolen which is all located in their report. There were no actual items that were considered legitimately stolen items. So this entire case is based on the 1,300.00 dollars worth of merchandise the Police had a SI bring into the store and even that stuff was claimed to be not stolen by the si.....
http://www.scribd.com/doc/17795198/07911992867-Case-in-Kansas-Guy-Neighbors-Motions-filed-on-his-behalf-
Friday, May 22, 2009
Guy Neighbors (owner of the yellow house store ) Bond Revoked !
Guy Neighbors's had his bond revoked this week due to an email he sent out to the FBI office in which he complained about lack of oversight in his case, which has been going on for 5 years now. Earlier Lawrence police complained about how Guy neighbors Blogs have caused them stress yet the same police continue to blog on the famous lawrence journal world website located here. http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/may/21/federal-magistrate-orders-yellow-house-owner-custo/
Interestingly enough they are quick to start blogging them selves after they claimed in a 275 page testimony that blogging was causing them undue stress. testimony located below:http://www.scribd.com/doc/14597829/Transcript-of-Hearing-Testimony-Case-072012401-marietta-parker-US-attorney-Yellow-house-store-owners
The Prosecutor outlined as the reasons for Guys bond to be revoked as the following:
I had a chance to look this document over. It is all Lies I have in bold the parts from the document and a response below it.
: (4) The threat of continued criminal defamation of Government counsel and witnesses if defendant were released poses a serious risk of danger to the community.
WHAT!?..... what danger does he pose to the community. He was never a danger to the community. None of his charges included killing some one or attacking someone. He is a danger to the corrupt police community, I will admit that.
: The pretrial services report indicates defendant has a significant prior criminal record (although not as significant in many federal felony cases).
I do believe the only criminal record Guy has on his record, Or at least the only one I could find was back in 1977 when he was pulled over for driving with Expired tags and that was over 30 years ago. Criminal records are matter of public record, why would they make a lie like that so blatant do they now know you can verify this information ?
: The pretrial services report submitted in connection with earlier detention hearings indicates defendant has a history relating to drug abuse.
.........False....
Guy neighbors has NO DRUG ABUSE HISTORY. pull up Guy's record there are no past arrests for drug violations.....Zero......
I wonder why they would say this ?
: (2) The record presented during earlier detention hearings indicates the Government has a fairly strong case against defendant.
This must be the reason why the gov't dropped the charges after the first 2 years. Or it could be the reason why guy has not been given a trial over the last 4 and 1/2 years..... because the gov'ts case is soooooo strong. Or maybe its because the last 5 hearings have been about the blogs and not the charges, If the case is so strong then the prosecutor should have no problem with someone claiming they are innocent and proving they are guilty.
: (1) Nature and circumstances of the offenses charged in the present case:
Conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud; and money laundering.
what happened to the rest of the charges ? I count 3 and this was supposed to be a 19 count situation.
: Alternatively, by clear and convincing evidence, the court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the
community. Specifically, the court finds that defendant poses a serious risk of
ongoing criminal defamation of Government counsel and witnesses.
I never would have guessed an email can be so dangerous to the community. Everyone should stop emailing immediately !
One of my concerns is this. If all of the above statements were true then why did it take 6 attempts to revoke guys bond and in those 6 attempts there was no mention of any of the above issues.
Here is a link to the rest of the court documents which the prosecutor is angry that they are made public.
http://www.scribd.com/people/documents/4230317-jones-walker
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Court transcripts on the neighbors case
The case with Guy and Carrie neighbors was posted online last week and its very funny stuff. Almost the entire hearing was devoted to talking about blogging and posts that were made on the internet. Apparently any one who posts anything against the prosecutors in this case, will be labeled as either Guy or Carrie them selves posting against the current case that has been going on for 5 years. The prosecutor has requested over 8 times to have the defendants bond revoked because of the public display he is making of the federal prosecutors.
here is a link to the transcripts.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14597829/Transcript-of-Hearing-Testimony-Case-number-072012401-marietta-parker-US-attorney-
Here is the latest in bond revoke requests.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14697585/Motion-Revoke-guy-neighbors-bond-attempt-8-by-Terra-d-morehead-and-marietta-parker-42709
Here is the motion filed by Guy's attorney this motion was to show that the prosecutor put abnormal restrictions on the viewing of evidence and was making it imposable to defend guy neighbors.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14701513/Cheryl-Motion-to-Withdraw-from-the-Yellow-house-case
http://www.scribd.com/doc/15121192/Marietta-Parker-case-no-072012402JPO-Guy-and-carrie-Neighbors-Motion-to-revoke-bond-Mental-evaluation-Cause-hearing-
here is a link to the transcripts.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14597829/Transcript-of-Hearing-Testimony-Case-number-072012401-marietta-parker-US-attorney-
Here is the latest in bond revoke requests.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14697585/Motion-Revoke-guy-neighbors-bond-attempt-8-by-Terra-d-morehead-and-marietta-parker-42709
Here is the motion filed by Guy's attorney this motion was to show that the prosecutor put abnormal restrictions on the viewing of evidence and was making it imposable to defend guy neighbors.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14701513/Cheryl-Motion-to-Withdraw-from-the-Yellow-house-case
http://www.scribd.com/doc/15121192/Marietta-Parker-case-no-072012402JPO-Guy-and-carrie-Neighbors-Motion-to-revoke-bond-Mental-evaluation-Cause-hearing-
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