government has failed to bring to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial act

Speedy Trial Violation in Yellow house case Order by Judge

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 07-20073-01/01-JWL
Guy Neighbors
and,
Carrie Neighbors,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Mr. Guy S. Neighbors and Ms. Carrie Neighbors (“defendants”) have moved to dismiss
with prejudice one of the criminal charges in a four-count indictment against them on the ground
that the government has failed to bring them to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The government objects.
I. Background
On December 7, 2006, the Neighbors were indicted for being unlawful users of a
controlled substance who knowingly and unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18,
sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), United States Code. The defendants made their first
appearance on December 12, 2006 in case No. 06-20171-CM, which is referred to by this court
as the “first indictment” or “first case.” On January 3, 2007, and February 5, 2007, defendant
Carrie Neighbors filed Motions for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions, which the judge
granted. The excluded time from these motions was also applied to co-defendant Guy
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Neighbors. On March 26, 2007, the court made a text entry noting that no motions had been
filed, and the jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the
government filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to both defendants based on additional
evidence discovered during the ongoing investigation. The judge sustained the motion on May
10, 2007, dismissing the indictment without prejudice.
On June 20, 2007, the defendants were indicted on four counts, including conspiring to
manufacture marijuana, being unlawful users of a controlled substance who knowingly and
unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18, sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 2”),
and two counts for knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana. The court will refer
to this indictment as the “second indictment.” (Doc. # 1) Defendants appeared before a
magistrate judge on June 25, 2007. On July 17, 2007, defendant Guy Neighbors filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions (Doc. # 16). At a hearing on August 13, 2007,
the court took the Motion for Extension of Time under advisement and granted Guy Neighbors’s
Motion to Withdraw his attorney (Doc. # 18). The Motion for Extension of Time was later
granted on September 10, 2007.
On September 11, 2007, counsel for Carrie Neighbors filed the Motion to Dismiss Count
2 (Doc. # 24) (“Motion”), currently at issue before the court. Guy Neighbors also filed a Motion
to Disclose Expert Testimony (Doc. # 27) on October 15, 2007, which is still pending. At the
evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2007, Guy Neighbors was permitted to join Carrie
Neighbor’s Motion to Dismiss via his Motion to Join Co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. # 28), thereby mooting his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. # 25) that had
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been filed on September 12, 2007. The Court also took the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 under
advisement, and after thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court grants the Motion
but reserves the determination of whether to grant it with or without prejudice until after an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
II. Analysis
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et. seq., is designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he intent of the Act [is] to balance protection of the accused against society’s interest in
efficient criminal process.”). It “requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within
seventy days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. Certain periods of
delay, outlined in detail in the STA, are excluded and do not count toward the seventy-day
limit.” See id. at 1178, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1)-(9); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1999). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy day
deadline, which is subject to statutory exclusions, “dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v.
Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1989). “The ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant.” Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, quoting United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d
1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)] as extended by
1There apparently was some confusion as to what the defendants were requesting of
the court–to dismiss the entire second indictment or only the one charge found in both the
first and second indictment. Upon inquiry by the court at the hearing, defense counsel
clarified that they were moving only to dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment, which was
the only count in the first indictment.
2“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
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section 3161(h) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)], the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.”).
A. Whether the time accrued under the first indictment for Speedy Trial Act purposes is
added to the time under the second indictment when the government moved to dismiss the
first indictment
The Neighbors brought a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count 2 of the second
indictment1 under chapter 18, section 3161(c)(1), United States Code, which relates to the
seventy day deadline.2 The Neighbors also cited section 3161(d)(1), but misinterpreted the
language, as did the government.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any
charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or
otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or
individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment
is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
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18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). Both sides apparently interpreted the language “the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent
complaint, indictment, or information” to mean that the seventy day time period from section
3161(c)(1) would not start anew with the second indictment. This language, however, is
interpreted to mean that when those sections do apply, a new seventy day time period does begin
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The question, then, is whether the provisions of section 3161(d)(1), and therefore a new
time period under section 3161(c)(1), apply when the government files the motion to dismiss the
first indictment. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit provided a clear and concise description of
the relationship between sections 3161(c) and 3161(d)(1):
Under § 3161(d)(1), if an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the defendant
and he is subsequently re-indicted with the same offense, the new indictment
begins a new seventy-day period. See § 3161(c); see also United States v.
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809, n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 183
F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 3161(d)(1) resets the periods in
which a defendant must be indicted and tried.”); United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the “Speedy Trial Act clock starts fresh”
when the defendant moves to dismiss and is reindicted); United States v.
Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant and there is reprosecution, the 70-day period
provided by § 3161(c) begins anew.”). . . .
However, where the government moves to dismiss the indictment . . . and then
refiles a second indictment alleging the same charges, the government does not
get a new seventy-day clock. See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broadwater, 151 F.3d 1359, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the government moves to dismiss a count following a mistrial, it
does not get a ‘fresh clock’ on reindictment; rather, the time is tolled from the
dismissal of the original count until the reindictment.”) (emphasis added); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hoslett,
998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 248 (8th
3The government also made the argument at the hearing that because no challenge was
made at the time the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the defendants should
not now be able to bring this motion to dismiss. This, however, is not the same argument the
defendants now make. There is nothing in a dismissal without prejudice that also means the
government can disregard the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. While the government
was free to indict the defendants with the same charge based upon the “without prejudice”
order, it still had an obligation to do so under the applicable time limits of section 3161(c)(1)
because the government, not the defendant, moved to dismiss the first indictment. The
argument, therefore, has no influence on the fact that the Speedy Trial Act deadline does not
start over when the government is the party that filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment.
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Cir. 1987) (same). “The reason for this rule is obvious. If the clock began anew,
the government could circumvent the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act by
repeatedly dismissing and refiling charges against a defendant.” Hoslett, 998 F.2d
at 658, n.12; see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463, n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (stating that when the original indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the government “and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense”
the time is tolled between the dismissal of the first indictment and when the time commences for
the subsequent charge, i.e., upon indictment or appearance); United States v. Magana-Olvera,
917 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the first indictment is dismissed on the government’s
motion, the statutory time limit is merely suspended until a new indictment is returned; the
70-day clock is not reset.”). It is clear that when the government moves to dismiss the first
indictment, as was the case here, the Speedy Trial Act clock does not begin anew for the same
charge filed in the second indictment; the time accrued towards the seventy days under the first
indictment is added to the time under the second indictment.3
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B. Calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act
The court concludes that the time accrued under the first indictment must be combined
with the time under the second indictment, so it is necessary to calculate the time included within
the Speedy Trial Act provisions. For a Speedy Trial Act violation to have occurred, seventy
non-excludable days must have passed since defendants appeared before the judicial officer on
December 12, 2006. “The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
[to dismiss indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act] but the Government shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under [18
U.S.C. §] 3161(h)(3).” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
In the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, the defendants claim that after reviewing the
docket sheet, they determined there were sixty-three days that should be included within the
Speedy Trial Act calculation under the first indictment. The sixty-three day total was determined
based on time between December 7, 2006, the day that the indictment was filed, and May 10,
2007, the day the indictment was dismissed. The first appearance as to the second indictment
was made on June 25, 2007 and Guy Neighbors filed a Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadlines on July 17, 2007. Between these dates, the defendant calculated that twenty-two days
should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculations. Under both indictments, the
defendants’ totals show the number of days as eighty-five. Upon independent review by this
court, according to ECF, fifty-eight days had accrued under the first indictment and twenty-one
days under the second indictment, totaling seventy-nine.
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The government has the burden of proving any applicable exclusion of time under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The government stated in its motion that twenty-two days had
elapsed under the second indictment, but made no other challenges to the calculations either in
its response to the motion or at the hearing. Whether the defendants’ calculation or the
calculation by ECF is accepted, the seventy day deadline has passed, and the government has
not proven that any other exclusions should apply to extend that time. The court, therefore,
grants the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2);
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“Subject to statutory exclusions, if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the seventy-day deadline, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).
C. Whether the dismissal of the case due to a Speedy Trial Act violation should be with or
without prejudice
Because the seventy day deadline has passed and the court dismisses the indictment on
Count 2, the court must determine whether the charge should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he district court retains broad discretion
whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.”). “In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the
following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Prejudice
to the defendant is among the other factors relevant to the district court’s consideration. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988).
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At the hearing because the court had not yet resolved whether there was a Speedy Trial
Act violation, little evidence or argument relating to these “with or without prejudice” factors
was presented. Now that the court has determined there has been such a violation and that Count
2 will be dismissed, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether
the count should be dismissed with or without prejudice. The court will take into consideration
evidence and arguments regarding the seriousness of the offense, facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the
Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice, as well as other factors, including the
prejudice suffered by the defendants.
III. Conclusion
In sum the court finds that where the government filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act time period does not start anew. Instead, the time
accrued under the first indictment is added to the accumulated time of the second indictment.
Based on this and the corresponding calculation of time exceeding seventy days, the court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2. The court reserves the ruling of whether to grant the
Motion with or without prejudice until an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Doc.
# 24) is GRANTED, but RESERVES the determination of whether to grant the motion with
or without prejudice until after the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge