local news paper runs a story on the motions for reinstating guy neighbors bond
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/jun/19/yellow-house-owner-asks-judge-reinstate-bond/
Friday, June 19, 2009
Lawrence police officer accused of selling stolen video games
OMG are you serious !?
Well folks here ya go this is a documented case of police corruption in the Lawrence police department.
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/jun/19/lawrence-police-officer-accused-selling-sto/
All I can say is wow.....
No wonder they were trying so hard to claim Guy and Carrie Neighbors were fencing stolen goods..... They are trying to Cover their ASS , I guess if you claim someone else is committing the crimes your committing your self then you can walk scott-free ! Only as long as you can sell the lie. Looks like Time has run up for the Lawrence police department trying to sell that lie.
Well folks here ya go this is a documented case of police corruption in the Lawrence police department.
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/jun/19/lawrence-police-officer-accused-selling-sto/
All I can say is wow.....
No wonder they were trying so hard to claim Guy and Carrie Neighbors were fencing stolen goods..... They are trying to Cover their ASS , I guess if you claim someone else is committing the crimes your committing your self then you can walk scott-free ! Only as long as you can sell the lie. Looks like Time has run up for the Lawrence police department trying to sell that lie.
Sunday, June 14, 2009
government has failed to bring to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial act
Speedy Trial Violation in Yellow house case Order by Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 07-20073-01/01-JWL
Guy Neighbors
and,
Carrie Neighbors,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Mr. Guy S. Neighbors and Ms. Carrie Neighbors (“defendants”) have moved to dismiss
with prejudice one of the criminal charges in a four-count indictment against them on the ground
that the government has failed to bring them to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The government objects.
I. Background
On December 7, 2006, the Neighbors were indicted for being unlawful users of a
controlled substance who knowingly and unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18,
sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), United States Code. The defendants made their first
appearance on December 12, 2006 in case No. 06-20171-CM, which is referred to by this court
as the “first indictment” or “first case.” On January 3, 2007, and February 5, 2007, defendant
Carrie Neighbors filed Motions for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions, which the judge
granted. The excluded time from these motions was also applied to co-defendant Guy
2
Neighbors. On March 26, 2007, the court made a text entry noting that no motions had been
filed, and the jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the
government filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to both defendants based on additional
evidence discovered during the ongoing investigation. The judge sustained the motion on May
10, 2007, dismissing the indictment without prejudice.
On June 20, 2007, the defendants were indicted on four counts, including conspiring to
manufacture marijuana, being unlawful users of a controlled substance who knowingly and
unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18, sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 2”),
and two counts for knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana. The court will refer
to this indictment as the “second indictment.” (Doc. # 1) Defendants appeared before a
magistrate judge on June 25, 2007. On July 17, 2007, defendant Guy Neighbors filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions (Doc. # 16). At a hearing on August 13, 2007,
the court took the Motion for Extension of Time under advisement and granted Guy Neighbors’s
Motion to Withdraw his attorney (Doc. # 18). The Motion for Extension of Time was later
granted on September 10, 2007.
On September 11, 2007, counsel for Carrie Neighbors filed the Motion to Dismiss Count
2 (Doc. # 24) (“Motion”), currently at issue before the court. Guy Neighbors also filed a Motion
to Disclose Expert Testimony (Doc. # 27) on October 15, 2007, which is still pending. At the
evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2007, Guy Neighbors was permitted to join Carrie
Neighbor’s Motion to Dismiss via his Motion to Join Co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. # 28), thereby mooting his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. # 25) that had
3
been filed on September 12, 2007. The Court also took the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 under
advisement, and after thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court grants the Motion
but reserves the determination of whether to grant it with or without prejudice until after an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
II. Analysis
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et. seq., is designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he intent of the Act [is] to balance protection of the accused against society’s interest in
efficient criminal process.”). It “requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within
seventy days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. Certain periods of
delay, outlined in detail in the STA, are excluded and do not count toward the seventy-day
limit.” See id. at 1178, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1)-(9); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1999). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy day
deadline, which is subject to statutory exclusions, “dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v.
Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1989). “The ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant.” Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, quoting United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d
1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)] as extended by
1There apparently was some confusion as to what the defendants were requesting of
the court–to dismiss the entire second indictment or only the one charge found in both the
first and second indictment. Upon inquiry by the court at the hearing, defense counsel
clarified that they were moving only to dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment, which was
the only count in the first indictment.
2“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
4
section 3161(h) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)], the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.”).
A. Whether the time accrued under the first indictment for Speedy Trial Act purposes is
added to the time under the second indictment when the government moved to dismiss the
first indictment
The Neighbors brought a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count 2 of the second
indictment1 under chapter 18, section 3161(c)(1), United States Code, which relates to the
seventy day deadline.2 The Neighbors also cited section 3161(d)(1), but misinterpreted the
language, as did the government.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any
charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or
otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or
individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment
is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
5
18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). Both sides apparently interpreted the language “the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent
complaint, indictment, or information” to mean that the seventy day time period from section
3161(c)(1) would not start anew with the second indictment. This language, however, is
interpreted to mean that when those sections do apply, a new seventy day time period does begin
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The question, then, is whether the provisions of section 3161(d)(1), and therefore a new
time period under section 3161(c)(1), apply when the government files the motion to dismiss the
first indictment. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit provided a clear and concise description of
the relationship between sections 3161(c) and 3161(d)(1):
Under § 3161(d)(1), if an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the defendant
and he is subsequently re-indicted with the same offense, the new indictment
begins a new seventy-day period. See § 3161(c); see also United States v.
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809, n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 183
F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 3161(d)(1) resets the periods in
which a defendant must be indicted and tried.”); United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the “Speedy Trial Act clock starts fresh”
when the defendant moves to dismiss and is reindicted); United States v.
Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant and there is reprosecution, the 70-day period
provided by § 3161(c) begins anew.”). . . .
However, where the government moves to dismiss the indictment . . . and then
refiles a second indictment alleging the same charges, the government does not
get a new seventy-day clock. See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broadwater, 151 F.3d 1359, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the government moves to dismiss a count following a mistrial, it
does not get a ‘fresh clock’ on reindictment; rather, the time is tolled from the
dismissal of the original count until the reindictment.”) (emphasis added); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hoslett,
998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 248 (8th
3The government also made the argument at the hearing that because no challenge was
made at the time the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the defendants should
not now be able to bring this motion to dismiss. This, however, is not the same argument the
defendants now make. There is nothing in a dismissal without prejudice that also means the
government can disregard the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. While the government
was free to indict the defendants with the same charge based upon the “without prejudice”
order, it still had an obligation to do so under the applicable time limits of section 3161(c)(1)
because the government, not the defendant, moved to dismiss the first indictment. The
argument, therefore, has no influence on the fact that the Speedy Trial Act deadline does not
start over when the government is the party that filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment.
6
Cir. 1987) (same). “The reason for this rule is obvious. If the clock began anew,
the government could circumvent the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act by
repeatedly dismissing and refiling charges against a defendant.” Hoslett, 998 F.2d
at 658, n.12; see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463, n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (stating that when the original indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the government “and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense”
the time is tolled between the dismissal of the first indictment and when the time commences for
the subsequent charge, i.e., upon indictment or appearance); United States v. Magana-Olvera,
917 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the first indictment is dismissed on the government’s
motion, the statutory time limit is merely suspended until a new indictment is returned; the
70-day clock is not reset.”). It is clear that when the government moves to dismiss the first
indictment, as was the case here, the Speedy Trial Act clock does not begin anew for the same
charge filed in the second indictment; the time accrued towards the seventy days under the first
indictment is added to the time under the second indictment.3
7
B. Calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act
The court concludes that the time accrued under the first indictment must be combined
with the time under the second indictment, so it is necessary to calculate the time included within
the Speedy Trial Act provisions. For a Speedy Trial Act violation to have occurred, seventy
non-excludable days must have passed since defendants appeared before the judicial officer on
December 12, 2006. “The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
[to dismiss indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act] but the Government shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under [18
U.S.C. §] 3161(h)(3).” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
In the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, the defendants claim that after reviewing the
docket sheet, they determined there were sixty-three days that should be included within the
Speedy Trial Act calculation under the first indictment. The sixty-three day total was determined
based on time between December 7, 2006, the day that the indictment was filed, and May 10,
2007, the day the indictment was dismissed. The first appearance as to the second indictment
was made on June 25, 2007 and Guy Neighbors filed a Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadlines on July 17, 2007. Between these dates, the defendant calculated that twenty-two days
should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculations. Under both indictments, the
defendants’ totals show the number of days as eighty-five. Upon independent review by this
court, according to ECF, fifty-eight days had accrued under the first indictment and twenty-one
days under the second indictment, totaling seventy-nine.
8
The government has the burden of proving any applicable exclusion of time under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The government stated in its motion that twenty-two days had
elapsed under the second indictment, but made no other challenges to the calculations either in
its response to the motion or at the hearing. Whether the defendants’ calculation or the
calculation by ECF is accepted, the seventy day deadline has passed, and the government has
not proven that any other exclusions should apply to extend that time. The court, therefore,
grants the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2);
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“Subject to statutory exclusions, if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the seventy-day deadline, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).
C. Whether the dismissal of the case due to a Speedy Trial Act violation should be with or
without prejudice
Because the seventy day deadline has passed and the court dismisses the indictment on
Count 2, the court must determine whether the charge should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he district court retains broad discretion
whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.”). “In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the
following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Prejudice
to the defendant is among the other factors relevant to the district court’s consideration. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988).
9
At the hearing because the court had not yet resolved whether there was a Speedy Trial
Act violation, little evidence or argument relating to these “with or without prejudice” factors
was presented. Now that the court has determined there has been such a violation and that Count
2 will be dismissed, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether
the count should be dismissed with or without prejudice. The court will take into consideration
evidence and arguments regarding the seriousness of the offense, facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the
Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice, as well as other factors, including the
prejudice suffered by the defendants.
III. Conclusion
In sum the court finds that where the government filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act time period does not start anew. Instead, the time
accrued under the first indictment is added to the accumulated time of the second indictment.
Based on this and the corresponding calculation of time exceeding seventy days, the court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2. The court reserves the ruling of whether to grant the
Motion with or without prejudice until an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Doc.
# 24) is GRANTED, but RESERVES the determination of whether to grant the motion with
or without prejudice until after the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 07-20073-01/01-JWL
Guy Neighbors
and,
Carrie Neighbors,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Mr. Guy S. Neighbors and Ms. Carrie Neighbors (“defendants”) have moved to dismiss
with prejudice one of the criminal charges in a four-count indictment against them on the ground
that the government has failed to bring them to trial promptly in violation of the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The government objects.
I. Background
On December 7, 2006, the Neighbors were indicted for being unlawful users of a
controlled substance who knowingly and unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18,
sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2), United States Code. The defendants made their first
appearance on December 12, 2006 in case No. 06-20171-CM, which is referred to by this court
as the “first indictment” or “first case.” On January 3, 2007, and February 5, 2007, defendant
Carrie Neighbors filed Motions for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions, which the judge
granted. The excluded time from these motions was also applied to co-defendant Guy
2
Neighbors. On March 26, 2007, the court made a text entry noting that no motions had been
filed, and the jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 7, 2007. On May 4, 2007, the
government filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to both defendants based on additional
evidence discovered during the ongoing investigation. The judge sustained the motion on May
10, 2007, dismissing the indictment without prejudice.
On June 20, 2007, the defendants were indicted on four counts, including conspiring to
manufacture marijuana, being unlawful users of a controlled substance who knowingly and
unlawfully possessed firearms under chapter 18, sections 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(2) (“Count 2”),
and two counts for knowingly and intentionally manufacturing marijuana. The court will refer
to this indictment as the “second indictment.” (Doc. # 1) Defendants appeared before a
magistrate judge on June 25, 2007. On July 17, 2007, defendant Guy Neighbors filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Pretrial Motions (Doc. # 16). At a hearing on August 13, 2007,
the court took the Motion for Extension of Time under advisement and granted Guy Neighbors’s
Motion to Withdraw his attorney (Doc. # 18). The Motion for Extension of Time was later
granted on September 10, 2007.
On September 11, 2007, counsel for Carrie Neighbors filed the Motion to Dismiss Count
2 (Doc. # 24) (“Motion”), currently at issue before the court. Guy Neighbors also filed a Motion
to Disclose Expert Testimony (Doc. # 27) on October 15, 2007, which is still pending. At the
evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2007, Guy Neighbors was permitted to join Carrie
Neighbor’s Motion to Dismiss via his Motion to Join Co-defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment (Doc. # 28), thereby mooting his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Doc. # 25) that had
3
been filed on September 12, 2007. The Court also took the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 under
advisement, and after thoroughly considering the parties’ arguments, the court grants the Motion
but reserves the determination of whether to grant it with or without prejudice until after an
evidentiary hearing on the issue.
II. Analysis
The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et. seq., is designed to protect a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1177 (10th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he intent of the Act [is] to balance protection of the accused against society’s interest in
efficient criminal process.”). It “requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence within
seventy days after his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later. Certain periods of
delay, outlined in detail in the STA, are excluded and do not count toward the seventy-day
limit.” See id. at 1178, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h)(1)-(9); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 1999). If a defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy day
deadline, which is subject to statutory exclusions, “dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 462 (10th Cir. 2006), quoting United States v.
Doran, 882 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1989). “The ‘indictment shall be dismissed on motion
of the defendant.” Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, quoting United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d
1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (“If a defendant is not brought to
trial within the time limit required by section 3161(c) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)] as extended by
1There apparently was some confusion as to what the defendants were requesting of
the court–to dismiss the entire second indictment or only the one charge found in both the
first and second indictment. Upon inquiry by the court at the hearing, defense counsel
clarified that they were moving only to dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment, which was
the only count in the first indictment.
2“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within
seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or
from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
4
section 3161(h) [18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)], the information or indictment shall be dismissed on
motion of the defendant.”).
A. Whether the time accrued under the first indictment for Speedy Trial Act purposes is
added to the time under the second indictment when the government moved to dismiss the
first indictment
The Neighbors brought a Motion to Dismiss Indictment as to Count 2 of the second
indictment1 under chapter 18, section 3161(c)(1), United States Code, which relates to the
seventy day deadline.2 The Neighbors also cited section 3161(d)(1), but misinterpreted the
language, as did the government.
If any indictment or information is dismissed upon motion of the defendant, or any
charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual is dismissed or
otherwise dropped, and thereafter a complaint is filed against such defendant or
individual charging him with the same offense or an offense based on the same
conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, or an information or indictment
is filed charging such defendant with the same offense or an offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such
subsequent complaint, indictment, or information, as the case may be.
5
18 U.S.C. § 3161(d)(1). Both sides apparently interpreted the language “the provisions of
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be applicable with respect to such subsequent
complaint, indictment, or information” to mean that the seventy day time period from section
3161(c)(1) would not start anew with the second indictment. This language, however, is
interpreted to mean that when those sections do apply, a new seventy day time period does begin
for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.
The question, then, is whether the provisions of section 3161(d)(1), and therefore a new
time period under section 3161(c)(1), apply when the government files the motion to dismiss the
first indictment. In a recent case, the Tenth Circuit provided a clear and concise description of
the relationship between sections 3161(c) and 3161(d)(1):
Under § 3161(d)(1), if an indictment is dismissed upon motion of the defendant
and he is subsequently re-indicted with the same offense, the new indictment
begins a new seventy-day period. See § 3161(c); see also United States v.
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 809, n.4 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 183
F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 3161(d)(1) resets the periods in
which a defendant must be indicted and tried.”); United States v. Duque, 62 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the “Speedy Trial Act clock starts fresh”
when the defendant moves to dismiss and is reindicted); United States v.
Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant and there is reprosecution, the 70-day period
provided by § 3161(c) begins anew.”). . . .
However, where the government moves to dismiss the indictment . . . and then
refiles a second indictment alleging the same charges, the government does not
get a new seventy-day clock. See United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431,
1433-34 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broadwater, 151 F.3d 1359, 1360 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“If the government moves to dismiss a count following a mistrial, it
does not get a ‘fresh clock’ on reindictment; rather, the time is tolled from the
dismissal of the original count until the reindictment.”) (emphasis added); United
States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hoslett,
998 F.2d 648, 658 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 248 (8th
3The government also made the argument at the hearing that because no challenge was
made at the time the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice, the defendants should
not now be able to bring this motion to dismiss. This, however, is not the same argument the
defendants now make. There is nothing in a dismissal without prejudice that also means the
government can disregard the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. While the government
was free to indict the defendants with the same charge based upon the “without prejudice”
order, it still had an obligation to do so under the applicable time limits of section 3161(c)(1)
because the government, not the defendant, moved to dismiss the first indictment. The
argument, therefore, has no influence on the fact that the Speedy Trial Act deadline does not
start over when the government is the party that filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment.
6
Cir. 1987) (same). “The reason for this rule is obvious. If the clock began anew,
the government could circumvent the limitations of the Speedy Trial Act by
repeatedly dismissing and refiling charges against a defendant.” Hoslett, 998 F.2d
at 658, n.12; see also United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 239 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (same).
United States v. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458, 463, n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (stating that when the original indictment is dismissed upon motion
of the government “and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense”
the time is tolled between the dismissal of the first indictment and when the time commences for
the subsequent charge, i.e., upon indictment or appearance); United States v. Magana-Olvera,
917 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the first indictment is dismissed on the government’s
motion, the statutory time limit is merely suspended until a new indictment is returned; the
70-day clock is not reset.”). It is clear that when the government moves to dismiss the first
indictment, as was the case here, the Speedy Trial Act clock does not begin anew for the same
charge filed in the second indictment; the time accrued towards the seventy days under the first
indictment is added to the time under the second indictment.3
7
B. Calculation of time under the Speedy Trial Act
The court concludes that the time accrued under the first indictment must be combined
with the time under the second indictment, so it is necessary to calculate the time included within
the Speedy Trial Act provisions. For a Speedy Trial Act violation to have occurred, seventy
non-excludable days must have passed since defendants appeared before the judicial officer on
December 12, 2006. “The defendant shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion
[to dismiss indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act] but the Government shall have the
burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with any exclusion of time under [18
U.S.C. §] 3161(h)(3).” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
In the Motion to Dismiss and at the hearing, the defendants claim that after reviewing the
docket sheet, they determined there were sixty-three days that should be included within the
Speedy Trial Act calculation under the first indictment. The sixty-three day total was determined
based on time between December 7, 2006, the day that the indictment was filed, and May 10,
2007, the day the indictment was dismissed. The first appearance as to the second indictment
was made on June 25, 2007 and Guy Neighbors filed a Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadlines on July 17, 2007. Between these dates, the defendant calculated that twenty-two days
should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculations. Under both indictments, the
defendants’ totals show the number of days as eighty-five. Upon independent review by this
court, according to ECF, fifty-eight days had accrued under the first indictment and twenty-one
days under the second indictment, totaling seventy-nine.
8
The government has the burden of proving any applicable exclusion of time under the
Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The government stated in its motion that twenty-two days had
elapsed under the second indictment, but made no other challenges to the calculations either in
its response to the motion or at the hearing. Whether the defendants’ calculation or the
calculation by ECF is accepted, the seventy day deadline has passed, and the government has
not proven that any other exclusions should apply to extend that time. The court, therefore,
grants the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the second indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2);
Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“Subject to statutory exclusions, if a defendant is not brought
to trial within the seventy-day deadline, dismissal of the indictment is mandatory.”).
C. Whether the dismissal of the case due to a Speedy Trial Act violation should be with or
without prejudice
Because the seventy day deadline has passed and the court dismisses the indictment on
Count 2, the court must determine whether the charge should be dismissed with or without
prejudice. Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462 (“[T]he district court retains broad discretion
whether to dismiss the indictment with or without prejudice.”). “In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the
following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter [18
U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq.] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Prejudice
to the defendant is among the other factors relevant to the district court’s consideration. Abdush-
Shakur, 465 F.3d at 462, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334 (1988).
9
At the hearing because the court had not yet resolved whether there was a Speedy Trial
Act violation, little evidence or argument relating to these “with or without prejudice” factors
was presented. Now that the court has determined there has been such a violation and that Count
2 will be dismissed, the court will hold an evidentiary hearing on the limited issue of whether
the count should be dismissed with or without prejudice. The court will take into consideration
evidence and arguments regarding the seriousness of the offense, facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the
Speedy Trial Act and on the administration of justice, as well as other factors, including the
prejudice suffered by the defendants.
III. Conclusion
In sum the court finds that where the government filed the motion to dismiss the first
indictment, the seventy day Speedy Trial Act time period does not start anew. Instead, the time
accrued under the first indictment is added to the accumulated time of the second indictment.
Based on this and the corresponding calculation of time exceeding seventy days, the court grants
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2. The court reserves the ruling of whether to grant the
Motion with or without prejudice until an evidentiary hearing is conducted on the matter.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that the Motion to Dismiss Count 2 (Doc.
# 24) is GRANTED, but RESERVES the determination of whether to grant the motion with
or without prejudice until after the evidentiary hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
Dated this 16th day of November, 2007.
s/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge
Friday, June 12, 2009
How long have the neighbors been awaiting trial ?
Wanna know how long the neighbors have been awaiting trial after they were claimed to be the largest fencing operation in Kansas by the Sgt. Dan Ward of the LPD ?
FIND OUT scary hu ?
FIND OUT scary hu ?
Lanny D. Welch and Marietta Parker's response to Guy neighbors release
It looks like Lanny and Parker are trying to keep guy in prison. Apparently between 3 months ago and now he has become a danger to the community. So over the last 4 and 1/2 years Parker has been persecuting guy neighbors and over the last 7 attempts at his bond revoked she has never mentioned anything about Guy being a danger to the community......very Strange don't ya think ?
why would he be a danger to the community ? one he is not charged with a violent crime and two the only fight he is in right now is the fight for the truth. Which has cause so much stress for certain individuals they label him a danger to the community due to his complaints about corruption in the Lawrence police department and the Justice department in kansas. I think I saw a movie once where a lady claimed she was innocent and the police were corrupt as hell and they claimed she was crazy and had her locked away in the nut house. I think the movie is called Changeling (2008).
07-20124-02 Lanny D. Welch's RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS’ MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PRET...
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(Kansas City Docket)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS, )
)
Defendant. )
Case No. 07-20124-02-CM
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS’ MOTION
FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
Comes now the United States of America by and through the undersigned
Assistant United States Attorney, and in opposition to defendant’s Motion for
Reinstatement of Pretrial Release, offers the following suggestions.
I. Relevant Procedural Background
On May 1, 2008, the United States filed its first Motion to Revoke Bond.
(Document [Doc.] 65) On July 18 and July 21, 2008, the magistrate judge conducted a
hearing on that motion. At the hearing, the government presented evidence that the
defendant had engaged in post-indictment criminal conduct including violations of § 21-
4004, K.S.A., criminal defamation; of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, influencing an officer; and of 18
U.S.C. § 1512, witness tampering. The government’s evidence was uncontroverted.
On August 30, 2008, before a decision was rendered on those issues, the parties
2
submitted an agreed-upon temporary restraining order “which specifically prohibits all
parties in this matter from making any statements, other than to members of the
defendants’ immediate family ... in writing, orally or by electronic dissemination, either
personally or indirectly through any party, including but not limited to any internet sites
or through any form of communication whatsoever which mentions the names of any
witnesses, attorneys, potential witnesses or of any persons associated with the
investigation or prosecution” of case No. 07-20124 and case No. 07-20073. The
temporary restraining order was approved by the court and filed in the record.
(Doc. 118, p. 1-2).
On Friday, August 8, 2008, in case No. 08-MJ-8077-01/02-JPO, the defendant
and his co-defendant/spouse, Carrie Neighbors, were charged in the District of Kansas
by complaint with one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and
arrested on that charge. On August 12, 2008, the government filed a second Motion to
Revoke Bond in this case based upon the arrest of the defendant on the criminal
complaint. That motion was denied on August 18, 2008.
On August 18, 2008, the provisions of the temporary restraining order were
made part of the conditions of the defendants’ bond in the cases styled United States v.
Guy and Carrie Neighbors, Case No. 07-20124 (Doc. 132) and Case No. 08-20105-
01/02-CM/JPO. (Doc. 27 in that case) Each of those orders provided in pertinent part:
“Conditions of release in the Obstruction Case will track those [which] have been
previously set in Case No. 07-20124 (the “EBayCase”) (Docs. 5 and 9). In addition to
those conditions, defendants shall comply with the agreed restraining order in the EBay
Case (Doc. 118).” (Docs. 132 and 27, respectively, p. 2).
3
On August 20, 2008, a grand jury found probable cause to believe that the
defendant and his spouse had committed the felony offense of obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 2, and returned a true bill charging them with that
offense in Case No, 08-20105-01/02-JWL. (Doc. 28 in Case No. 08-20105)
On April 27, 2009, the government filed another Motion to Revoke Bond or, In the
Alternative, for Mental Examination and for Show Cause Hearing. (Doc. 165) The
basis for the motion was yet another dissemination by Guy M. Neighbors of what he
knew to be false and defamatory information about several of the witnesses in this case
and the prosecutors. After a hearing on the government’s Motion, the magistrate judge
made numerous factual findings as required under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g) including a determination that the “threat of continued criminal defamation of
Government counsel and witnesses if defendant were released poses a serious risk of
danger to the community.” (Doc. 175 at p. 3) It is this finding that the defendant
contests, alleging in his motion that “[s]urely this is not the kind or ‘nature’ of danger
which pretrial detention is designed to prevent.” (Doc. 176 at p. 4) This contention is not
supported by statute or case law, however.
II. Relevant Statutory Authority
A. Standard of Review: Title 18, United States Code, Section 3145 provides:
(b) Review of a detention order. – If a person is ordered by a
magistrate judge, or by a person other than a judge of a court having
original jurisdiction over the offense other than a Federal appellate court,
the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction of the
offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order. The motion
shall be determined promptly
“When the district court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3145(b) acts on a motion to revoke or
4
amend a magistrate’s pretrial detention or release order, the court acts de novo and
makes an independent determination of the proper pretrial detention or conditions of
release.” United States v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Timley, 236 Fed.Appx 441, 2007 WL 1620518 (C.A. 10 (Kan.))
(unpublished, attached as Exhibit 1) (“Upon its de novo review, the district court made
even more extensive findings concerning [the defendant’s] “continuous stream of
[criminal] activity.”)
Claims of erroneous detention present questions of mixed law and fact.
United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003) On appeal,
we review the mixed questions fo law and fact concerning the detention
decision de novo, “but we accept the district court’s findings of historical
fact which support that decision unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id.
The concept of safety of the community under § 3142(e) is not limited to
the danger of physical violence, but rather “refers to the danger that the
defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the
community.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Boy, 2009 WL 1010099 (C.A. 10 (N.M.)) (unpublished, attached as
Exhibit 2). As the following discussion will establish, the defendant’s conduct while on
pretrial release in this case clearly indicates that there is a substantial danger that the
defendant will continue to engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community
and that such conduct supports an order of detention.
B. Sanctions for violations of a release condition: Title 18, United States
Code, Section § 3148 entitled “Sanctions for violation of a release condition provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Available sanctions.– A person who has been released under
section 3142 of this title, and who has violated a condition of his release,
is subject to a revocation of release, an order of detention, and a
prosectuion for contempt of court.
5
(b) Revocation of Release.– ... To the extent practicable, a person
charged with violating the condition of release that such person not
commit a Federal, State or local crime during the period of release, shall
be brought before the judicial officer who ordered the release and whose
order is alleged to have been violated,. The judicial officer shall enter an
order of revocation and detention, if after a hearing, the judicial officer –
(1) finds that there is –
(A) probable cause to believe that the person has committed a
Federal, State or local crime while on release; or
(B) clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated
any other condition of release; and
(2) finds that –
(A) based on the factors set forth in section 3142(g) of this title,
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will
assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of
any other person or the community; or
(B) the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or
combination of conditions of release.
If there is probable cause to believe that, while on release, the person
committed a Federal, State or local felony, a rebuttable presumption
arises that no condition or combination of conditions will assure that the
person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community.”
Id.
“[A] district’s court’s finding that a defendant will not abide by any conditions of
release may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.
Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1990) (Section 3148(b) clearly provides that these
findings alone are sufficient to justify revocation and detention and court need not also
find the defendant will flee or pose danger to the community). The record in this case
establishes probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a Federal
felony while on release. It also establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that this
defendant has committed numerous violations of the terms of his release by continue to
publish electronically false statements about the witnesses and the prosecutors and that
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will assure the safety of
1“Actual malice” occurs when a defendant makes a false publication with a “high
degree of awareness of ...probable falsity,” (citation omitted) or must have “entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667; 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989).
6
the community.
III. Discussion
The record before this Court clearly established that the defendant has, while on
pretrial release, committed several criminal offenses including violations of
§ 21-4004, K.S.A., criminal defamation, a state misdemeanor; of 18 U.S.C. § 1503,
Influencing an Officer, a Federal felony offense; of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (d), tampering with
a witness and of 18 U.S.C. 1512 (c) obstruction of justice, both Federal felony offenses.
A. Criminal Defamation: The record before the magistrate judge and
now before this Court clearly establishes that defendant has violated, K.S.A. § 21-4004,
Criminal Defamation. That statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Criminal defamation is communicating to a person orally, in
writing, or by any other means, information, knowing the information to be
false and with actual malice1, tending to expose another living person to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule; intending to deprive such person of the
benefits of public confidence and social acceptance....
On Wednesday, April 22, 2009, the defendant, Guy M. Neighbors, sent by
electronic mail a message to various individuals and organizations under the heading
“Lawrence Police officer Mike McAtee corruptly operates as a Federal agent crossing
state lines to interrogate and harass people for Federal Prosecutor Terra Morehead.”
(Exhibit 3, attached). Attached to that e-mail were various documents, one of which
was entitled “Notice of Motion Requesting a Change of Venue and to Have Both
Prosecutors Recuses [sic] Themselves from Said Cases as To Avoid the Appearance of
7
A Conflict of Interest.”
In his e-mail message, the defendant reiterated statements made in earlier emails
that he knew to be false, to wit:
1. Federal Prosecutor Terra Morehead sent Lawrence Police
officer Mike McAtee across state lines to the State of Florida, to
investigate with the Jurisdictions [sic] of a Federal agent.
2. Lawrence Kansas Police officers Jay Bailek and Mickey Rantz
pose as FBI agents while conducting Federal investigations for Marietta
Parker and Terra Morehead in the Yellow House case, to cover-up for
missing evidence, search warrant & chain of custody violations and the
lack of FBI involvement in the case.
3. Kansas City FBI Agent Walter Schaefer, poses as FBI agent
Bob Shaefer, to conduct fake FBI investigations outside of his agencies
[sic] juristictions [sic] to cover-up for Federal Prosecutor Marietta Parker,
who is conspiring to cover-up police misconduct.
The defendant knew that these statements were false when he made them
because at the hearing before the magistrate judge on July 18 and July 21, 2008, it was
established that: all physical evidence recovered during the investigation of this case is
either in the custody of the Lawrence, Kansas, Police Department or has been returned
to the rightful owners (Doc. 150, Transcript of Motions Hearing held on July 18 and 21,
2008, testimony of S.A. D. Nitz, at pp. 217-18); that neither Officer Bailek nor Officer
Rantz posed as FBI agents during the investigation of this case (Doc 150 at p 37-38,
testimony of P.O. M. Rantz); and that F.B.I. S.A. Walter Robert “Bob” Schaefer
conducted an investigation of those allegations and was unable to corroborate the
allegation. See (Doc. 150 at p 186-192, testimony of S.A. W. Schaefer). Rather than
cease his criminal defamation after being informed of the falsity of the above-referenced
allegations, the defendant republished those same false claims of illegal or unethical
2 Counsel for the United States categorically and unequivocally deny each and
every one of the allegations made against them in the defendant’s e-mail of April 22nd.
8
behavior on the part of government witnesses. Therefore, a determination that this
conduct constituted criminal defamation is supported by the record.
In addition to the reassertion of the above-described allegations that the
defendant knew to be false, he made additional false and defamatory allegations of
misconduct by the prosecutors in this case without any basis in fact. In his e-mail of
April 22, he stated:
Where is the oversight of Government spending and constitutional law that
would allow Federal Prosecutors in an abuse of power spend millions of
tax dollars investigating and prosecuting meritless cases, using defense
attorneys and law enforcement as their own personal pawns, operating
outside of their agencies jurisdictions and the law, crossing state lines,
City officers acting as Federal Investigators, repeatedly violating citizens
[sic] Constitutional rights without consequence.
Now we are hearing rumor of a sex scandal involving high ranking
officials, the same officials who are the alleged violator [sic] of human
rights. Please we need a complete investigation into these two
prosecutors and the cases they have prosecuted.2
Ex. 1, attached.
The defendant is fully aware that all of the individuals mentioned in the abovereferenced
paragraphs of his April 22 e-mail are witnesses in the case or are attorneys
representing the government. In light of the un-controverted evidence received at the
hearing on the government’s first motion to revoke bond and by his own admission that
the reference to sexual misconduct by the prosecutors in this case are mere rumors, it
is clear that the defendant intentionally and purposefully violated the conditions of his
3This statement, by the defendant’s own admission was based upon nothing but
rumor, and can be characterized only as one made with actual malice because it was
made without a reasonable basis in fact leading to only one reasonable inference: that
the defendant made the statement with a high degree of awareness of its probable
falsity.
9
bond by publishing those statements with actual malice,3 thereby committing the state
offense of criminal defamation in violation of § 21-4004, K.S.A.
The defendant argues that because the e-mail of April 22, 2009, “is one email
since the condition was placed on him in August 2008", the risk of criminal defamation
cannot be said to be high or “serious.” This claim is irrelevant to the magistrate judge’s
decision to revoke Guy Neighbors’ bond, however, because § 3148 requires only that
the Court find probable cause to believe that the person has committed a Federal,
State or local crime while on release.
Furthermore, the violation of the terms of the defendant’s conditions of release
on April 22 is not the only instance of his failure to abide by that condition. The
defendant has committed additional instances of criminal defamation since the hearing
in July, 2008, and has done so after being counseled by the magistrate judge to stop
blogging about this case. (Doc. 150 at p. 245) For example, on December 2, 2008
(Exhibit 4, attached), and again on March 13, 2009 (Exhibit 5, attached), he sent e-mails
to various individuals and organizations that contain false and defamatory allegations
against several witnesses and prosecutors. This recurring conduct leads to only one
reasonable conclusion: Guy Neighbors is unwilling and therefore unlikely to abide by
that condition of his release and will continue to defame witnesses and prosecutors in
defiance of the Court’s orders of release and of the temporary restraining order.
10
Consequently, a determination that revocation is the only remedy for the defendant’s
continued criminal conduct and his unwillingness to abide by the conditions of his
pretrial release is legally appropriate.
B. Obstruction of Justice – 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c). On August 20, 2008, the
defendant was charged by Indictment with one count of obstruction of justice in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §1512. (Exhibit 6, attached) “[A]n indictment, ‘fair upon its face,’ and
returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury’ conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d,
471 (1997) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 410 U.S. 103, 118 n. 19, 95 S. Ct 854, 43 L.Ed.2d
54 (1975). “[P]robable cause under § 3148(b)(1)(A) requires only that the facts
available to the judicial officer ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that
the defendant has committed a crime while on bail.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d
1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773, 777 (2nd Cir.
1986) This charge was the subject of the government’s Section Motion to Revoke Bond
and, standing alone, is a sufficient basis to support an order of release revocation in this
case. (Doc. 128) Consequently, the facts available to this Court warrant a finding that
this defendant has committed another Federal felony offense while on bail.
The commission of a serious crime by a released person is plainly
indicative of his inability to conform to one of the most basic conditions of
his release, i.e. that he abide by the law, and of the danger he poses to
other persons and the community, factors which section 3148 recognizes
are appropriate bases for the revocation of release.
***
[T]he establishment of probable cause to believe that the defendant has
committed a serious crime while on release constitutes compelling
evidence that the defendant poses a danger to the community, and, once
11
such probable cause is established, it is appropriate that the burden rest
on the defendant to come forward with evidence indicating that this
conclusion is not warranted in his case.
Id. at 1161 (quoting The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, pp. 3182, et seq., Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
The clear and convincing evidence standard is also utilized in 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(2)(B), with respect to a defendant’s danger to the community at
the pretrial stage. This standard has been construed by the Second
Circuit as “something more than ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ and
something less that ‘beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985) “[T]his standard of proof
requires that the evidence support such a conclusion with a high degree of
certainty. Id.
United States v. Ross, 730 F.Supp. 255, 356-57 (D.Kan. 1990). “[O]nce the burden of
production is met, the presumption does not disappear, but remains as a factor for
consideration in the ultimate release or detention determination.” United States v.
Cook, 880 F.2d at 1162. The United States respectfully submits that the defendant
cannot meet his burden.
C. Tampering with a witness (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) and
Influencing an Officer (18 U.S.C. § 1503)
The United States incorporates by this reference all of the evidence, arguments,
and points and authorities advanced in it’s first Motion to Revoke Bond (Doc. 65), the
exhibits attached thereto (Docs. 66 & 67), the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing
on July 18 & 21, 2008, on the government’s motion (Doc. 150) and the exhibits received
in evidence at that hearing and further requests that this Court take judicial notice of the
complete record before it. The evidence received by the court at the hearing on July 18
and July 21, 2008, established that the defendant has committed numerous violations of
both of these Federal felony offenses. Additionally, his unfounded and defamatory
4 The false allegations of professional and sexual misconduct by the prosecutors
taken together with the demand in the attachment to the e-mail, entitled “Notice of
Motion Requesting a Change of Venue and to Have Both Prosecutors Recuses [sic]
Themselves from Said Cases as To Avoid the Appearance of A Conflict of Interest”
indicates that the defendant continues in his attempts to prevent the attorneys for the
government from prosecuting the cases now pending against him, a clear attempt to
corruptly influence these officers of the Court in the lawful performance of their duties.
12
claims of sexual misconduct by the prosecutors made in his e-mail of April 22, 2009,
coupled with the reiteration of his demand that they be recused from this case
establishes that the defendant continues to engage in conduct that constitutes a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, influencing an officer. 4 Likewise, his repetition of what
he knows to be false and defamatory allegations of illegal conduct by several of the
witnesses in that same e-mail further establishes probable cause to believe that he
continues to commit violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, witness tampering.
Unquestionably, the e-mail sent by the defendant on April 22, 2009, constitutes yet
another violation of the conditions of the defendant’s bond, establishes that he
continues to commit violations of these two criminal statutes and establishes that he is
unwilling to conform his behavior to the order of the court.
13
Conclusion
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that
the defendant’s Motion for Reinstatement of Pretrial Release be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Lanny D. Welch
United States Attorney
s/ Marietta Parker, KS Dist. Ct. #77807
First Assistant United States Attorney
500 State Avenue; Suite 360
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Telephone: 913-551-6730
Facsimile: 913-551-6541
E-mail: marietta.parker@usdoj.gov
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Attorneys for Plaintiff
14
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of June, 2009, the foregoing was electronically
filed with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of
electronic filing to the following:
John Duma
303 E. Poplar
Olathe, KS 66061
Attorney for Defendant Carrie Marie Neighbors
Cheryl A. Pilate
Morgan Pilate LLC
142 N. Cherry
Olathe, KS 66061
Attorney for Defendant Guy Madison Neighbors
I further certify that on this date the foregoing document and the notice of
electronic filing were mailed by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
None
s/Marietta Parker
First Assistant United States Attorney
why would he be a danger to the community ? one he is not charged with a violent crime and two the only fight he is in right now is the fight for the truth. Which has cause so much stress for certain individuals they label him a danger to the community due to his complaints about corruption in the Lawrence police department and the Justice department in kansas. I think I saw a movie once where a lady claimed she was innocent and the police were corrupt as hell and they claimed she was crazy and had her locked away in the nut house. I think the movie is called Changeling (2008).
07-20124-02 Lanny D. Welch's RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS’ MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PRET...
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(Kansas City Docket)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS, )
)
Defendant. )
Case No. 07-20124-02-CM
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
GUY MADISON NEIGHBORS’ MOTION
FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
Comes now the United States of America by and through the undersigned
Assistant United States Attorney, and in opposition to defendant’s Motion for
Reinstatement of Pretrial Release, offers the following suggestions.
I. Relevant Procedural Background
On May 1, 2008, the United States filed its first Motion to Revoke Bond.
(Document [Doc.] 65) On July 18 and July 21, 2008, the magistrate judge conducted a
hearing on that motion. At the hearing, the government presented evidence that the
defendant had engaged in post-indictment criminal conduct including violations of § 21-
4004, K.S.A., criminal defamation; of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, influencing an officer; and of 18
U.S.C. § 1512, witness tampering. The government’s evidence was uncontroverted.
On August 30, 2008, before a decision was rendered on those issues, the parties
2
submitted an agreed-upon temporary restraining order “which specifically prohibits all
parties in this matter from making any statements, other than to members of the
defendants’ immediate family ... in writing, orally or by electronic dissemination, either
personally or indirectly through any party, including but not limited to any internet sites
or through any form of communication whatsoever which mentions the names of any
witnesses, attorneys, potential witnesses or of any persons associated with the
investigation or prosecution” of case No. 07-20124 and case No. 07-20073. The
temporary restraining order was approved by the court and filed in the record.
(Doc. 118, p. 1-2).
On Friday, August 8, 2008, in case No. 08-MJ-8077-01/02-JPO, the defendant
and his co-defendant/spouse, Carrie Neighbors, were charged in the District of Kansas
by complaint with one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and
arrested on that charge. On August 12, 2008, the government filed a second Motion to
Revoke Bond in this case based upon the arrest of the defendant on the criminal
complaint. That motion was denied on August 18, 2008.
On August 18, 2008, the provisions of the temporary restraining order were
made part of the conditions of the defendants’ bond in the cases styled United States v.
Guy and Carrie Neighbors, Case No. 07-20124 (Doc. 132) and Case No. 08-20105-
01/02-CM/JPO. (Doc. 27 in that case) Each of those orders provided in pertinent part:
“Conditions of release in the Obstruction Case will track those [which] have been
previously set in Case No. 07-20124 (the “EBayCase”) (Docs. 5 and 9). In addition to
those conditions, defendants shall comply with the agreed restraining order in the EBay
Case (Doc. 118).” (Docs. 132 and 27, respectively, p. 2).
3
On August 20, 2008, a grand jury found probable cause to believe that the
defendant and his spouse had committed the felony offense of obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 2, and returned a true bill charging them with that
offense in Case No, 08-20105-01/02-JWL. (Doc. 28 in Case No. 08-20105)
On April 27, 2009, the government filed another Motion to Revoke Bond or, In the
Alternative, for Mental Examination and for Show Cause Hearing. (Doc. 165) The
basis for the motion was yet another dissemination by Guy M. Neighbors of what he
knew to be false and defamatory information about several of the witnesses in this case
and the prosecutors. After a hearing on the government’s Motion, the magistrate judge
made numerous factual findings as required under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g) including a determination that the “threat of continued criminal defamation of
Government counsel and witnesses if defendant were released poses a serious risk of
danger to the community.” (Doc. 175 at p. 3) It is this finding that the defendant
contests, alleging in his motion that “[s]urely this is not the kind or ‘nature’ of danger
which pretrial detention is designed to prevent.” (Doc. 176 at p. 4) This contention is not
supported by statute or case law, however.
II. Relevant Statutory Authority
A. Standard of Review: Title 18, United States Code, Section 3145 provides:
(b) Review of a detention order. – If a person is ordered by a
magistrate judge, or by a person other than a judge of a court having
original jurisdiction over the offense other than a Federal appellate court,
the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction of the
offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order. The motion
shall be determined promptly
“When the district court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3145(b) acts on a motion to revoke or
4
amend a magistrate’s pretrial detention or release order, the court acts de novo and
makes an independent determination of the proper pretrial detention or conditions of
release.” United States v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Timley, 236 Fed.Appx 441, 2007 WL 1620518 (C.A. 10 (Kan.))
(unpublished, attached as Exhibit 1) (“Upon its de novo review, the district court made
even more extensive findings concerning [the defendant’s] “continuous stream of
[criminal] activity.”)
Claims of erroneous detention present questions of mixed law and fact.
United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003) On appeal,
we review the mixed questions fo law and fact concerning the detention
decision de novo, “but we accept the district court’s findings of historical
fact which support that decision unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id.
The concept of safety of the community under § 3142(e) is not limited to
the danger of physical violence, but rather “refers to the danger that the
defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the
community.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Boy, 2009 WL 1010099 (C.A. 10 (N.M.)) (unpublished, attached as
Exhibit 2). As the following discussion will establish, the defendant’s conduct while on
pretrial release in this case clearly indicates that there is a substantial danger that the
defendant will continue to engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community
and that such conduct supports an order of detention.
B. Sanctions for violations of a release condition: Title 18, United States
Code, Section § 3148 entitled “Sanctions for violation of a release condition provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Available sanctions.– A person who has been released under
section 3142 of this title, and who has violated a condition of his release,
is subject to a revocation of release, an order of detention, and a
prosectuion for contempt of court.
5
(b) Revocation of Release.– ... To the extent practicable, a person
charged with violating the condition of release that such person not
commit a Federal, State or local crime during the period of release, shall
be brought before the judicial officer who ordered the release and whose
order is alleged to have been violated,. The judicial officer shall enter an
order of revocation and detention, if after a hearing, the judicial officer –
(1) finds that there is –
(A) probable cause to believe that the person has committed a
Federal, State or local crime while on release; or
(B) clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated
any other condition of release; and
(2) finds that –
(A) based on the factors set forth in section 3142(g) of this title,
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will
assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of
any other person or the community; or
(B) the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or
combination of conditions of release.
If there is probable cause to believe that, while on release, the person
committed a Federal, State or local felony, a rebuttable presumption
arises that no condition or combination of conditions will assure that the
person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community.”
Id.
“[A] district’s court’s finding that a defendant will not abide by any conditions of
release may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.
Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1990) (Section 3148(b) clearly provides that these
findings alone are sufficient to justify revocation and detention and court need not also
find the defendant will flee or pose danger to the community). The record in this case
establishes probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a Federal
felony while on release. It also establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that this
defendant has committed numerous violations of the terms of his release by continue to
publish electronically false statements about the witnesses and the prosecutors and that
there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will assure the safety of
1“Actual malice” occurs when a defendant makes a false publication with a “high
degree of awareness of ...probable falsity,” (citation omitted) or must have “entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667; 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (1989).
6
the community.
III. Discussion
The record before this Court clearly established that the defendant has, while on
pretrial release, committed several criminal offenses including violations of
§ 21-4004, K.S.A., criminal defamation, a state misdemeanor; of 18 U.S.C. § 1503,
Influencing an Officer, a Federal felony offense; of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (d), tampering with
a witness and of 18 U.S.C. 1512 (c) obstruction of justice, both Federal felony offenses.
A. Criminal Defamation: The record before the magistrate judge and
now before this Court clearly establishes that defendant has violated, K.S.A. § 21-4004,
Criminal Defamation. That statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Criminal defamation is communicating to a person orally, in
writing, or by any other means, information, knowing the information to be
false and with actual malice1, tending to expose another living person to
public hatred, contempt or ridicule; intending to deprive such person of the
benefits of public confidence and social acceptance....
On Wednesday, April 22, 2009, the defendant, Guy M. Neighbors, sent by
electronic mail a message to various individuals and organizations under the heading
“Lawrence Police officer Mike McAtee corruptly operates as a Federal agent crossing
state lines to interrogate and harass people for Federal Prosecutor Terra Morehead.”
(Exhibit 3, attached). Attached to that e-mail were various documents, one of which
was entitled “Notice of Motion Requesting a Change of Venue and to Have Both
Prosecutors Recuses [sic] Themselves from Said Cases as To Avoid the Appearance of
7
A Conflict of Interest.”
In his e-mail message, the defendant reiterated statements made in earlier emails
that he knew to be false, to wit:
1. Federal Prosecutor Terra Morehead sent Lawrence Police
officer Mike McAtee across state lines to the State of Florida, to
investigate with the Jurisdictions [sic] of a Federal agent.
2. Lawrence Kansas Police officers Jay Bailek and Mickey Rantz
pose as FBI agents while conducting Federal investigations for Marietta
Parker and Terra Morehead in the Yellow House case, to cover-up for
missing evidence, search warrant & chain of custody violations and the
lack of FBI involvement in the case.
3. Kansas City FBI Agent Walter Schaefer, poses as FBI agent
Bob Shaefer, to conduct fake FBI investigations outside of his agencies
[sic] juristictions [sic] to cover-up for Federal Prosecutor Marietta Parker,
who is conspiring to cover-up police misconduct.
The defendant knew that these statements were false when he made them
because at the hearing before the magistrate judge on July 18 and July 21, 2008, it was
established that: all physical evidence recovered during the investigation of this case is
either in the custody of the Lawrence, Kansas, Police Department or has been returned
to the rightful owners (Doc. 150, Transcript of Motions Hearing held on July 18 and 21,
2008, testimony of S.A. D. Nitz, at pp. 217-18); that neither Officer Bailek nor Officer
Rantz posed as FBI agents during the investigation of this case (Doc 150 at p 37-38,
testimony of P.O. M. Rantz); and that F.B.I. S.A. Walter Robert “Bob” Schaefer
conducted an investigation of those allegations and was unable to corroborate the
allegation. See (Doc. 150 at p 186-192, testimony of S.A. W. Schaefer). Rather than
cease his criminal defamation after being informed of the falsity of the above-referenced
allegations, the defendant republished those same false claims of illegal or unethical
2 Counsel for the United States categorically and unequivocally deny each and
every one of the allegations made against them in the defendant’s e-mail of April 22nd.
8
behavior on the part of government witnesses. Therefore, a determination that this
conduct constituted criminal defamation is supported by the record.
In addition to the reassertion of the above-described allegations that the
defendant knew to be false, he made additional false and defamatory allegations of
misconduct by the prosecutors in this case without any basis in fact. In his e-mail of
April 22, he stated:
Where is the oversight of Government spending and constitutional law that
would allow Federal Prosecutors in an abuse of power spend millions of
tax dollars investigating and prosecuting meritless cases, using defense
attorneys and law enforcement as their own personal pawns, operating
outside of their agencies jurisdictions and the law, crossing state lines,
City officers acting as Federal Investigators, repeatedly violating citizens
[sic] Constitutional rights without consequence.
Now we are hearing rumor of a sex scandal involving high ranking
officials, the same officials who are the alleged violator [sic] of human
rights. Please we need a complete investigation into these two
prosecutors and the cases they have prosecuted.2
Ex. 1, attached.
The defendant is fully aware that all of the individuals mentioned in the abovereferenced
paragraphs of his April 22 e-mail are witnesses in the case or are attorneys
representing the government. In light of the un-controverted evidence received at the
hearing on the government’s first motion to revoke bond and by his own admission that
the reference to sexual misconduct by the prosecutors in this case are mere rumors, it
is clear that the defendant intentionally and purposefully violated the conditions of his
3This statement, by the defendant’s own admission was based upon nothing but
rumor, and can be characterized only as one made with actual malice because it was
made without a reasonable basis in fact leading to only one reasonable inference: that
the defendant made the statement with a high degree of awareness of its probable
falsity.
9
bond by publishing those statements with actual malice,3 thereby committing the state
offense of criminal defamation in violation of § 21-4004, K.S.A.
The defendant argues that because the e-mail of April 22, 2009, “is one email
since the condition was placed on him in August 2008", the risk of criminal defamation
cannot be said to be high or “serious.” This claim is irrelevant to the magistrate judge’s
decision to revoke Guy Neighbors’ bond, however, because § 3148 requires only that
the Court find probable cause to believe that the person has committed a Federal,
State or local crime while on release.
Furthermore, the violation of the terms of the defendant’s conditions of release
on April 22 is not the only instance of his failure to abide by that condition. The
defendant has committed additional instances of criminal defamation since the hearing
in July, 2008, and has done so after being counseled by the magistrate judge to stop
blogging about this case. (Doc. 150 at p. 245) For example, on December 2, 2008
(Exhibit 4, attached), and again on March 13, 2009 (Exhibit 5, attached), he sent e-mails
to various individuals and organizations that contain false and defamatory allegations
against several witnesses and prosecutors. This recurring conduct leads to only one
reasonable conclusion: Guy Neighbors is unwilling and therefore unlikely to abide by
that condition of his release and will continue to defame witnesses and prosecutors in
defiance of the Court’s orders of release and of the temporary restraining order.
10
Consequently, a determination that revocation is the only remedy for the defendant’s
continued criminal conduct and his unwillingness to abide by the conditions of his
pretrial release is legally appropriate.
B. Obstruction of Justice – 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (c). On August 20, 2008, the
defendant was charged by Indictment with one count of obstruction of justice in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §1512. (Exhibit 6, attached) “[A]n indictment, ‘fair upon its face,’ and
returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury’ conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d,
471 (1997) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 410 U.S. 103, 118 n. 19, 95 S. Ct 854, 43 L.Ed.2d
54 (1975). “[P]robable cause under § 3148(b)(1)(A) requires only that the facts
available to the judicial officer ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that
the defendant has committed a crime while on bail.” United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d
1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773, 777 (2nd Cir.
1986) This charge was the subject of the government’s Section Motion to Revoke Bond
and, standing alone, is a sufficient basis to support an order of release revocation in this
case. (Doc. 128) Consequently, the facts available to this Court warrant a finding that
this defendant has committed another Federal felony offense while on bail.
The commission of a serious crime by a released person is plainly
indicative of his inability to conform to one of the most basic conditions of
his release, i.e. that he abide by the law, and of the danger he poses to
other persons and the community, factors which section 3148 recognizes
are appropriate bases for the revocation of release.
***
[T]he establishment of probable cause to believe that the defendant has
committed a serious crime while on release constitutes compelling
evidence that the defendant poses a danger to the community, and, once
11
such probable cause is established, it is appropriate that the burden rest
on the defendant to come forward with evidence indicating that this
conclusion is not warranted in his case.
Id. at 1161 (quoting The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News, pp. 3182, et seq., Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
The clear and convincing evidence standard is also utilized in 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(2)(B), with respect to a defendant’s danger to the community at
the pretrial stage. This standard has been construed by the Second
Circuit as “something more than ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ and
something less that ‘beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985) “[T]his standard of proof
requires that the evidence support such a conclusion with a high degree of
certainty. Id.
United States v. Ross, 730 F.Supp. 255, 356-57 (D.Kan. 1990). “[O]nce the burden of
production is met, the presumption does not disappear, but remains as a factor for
consideration in the ultimate release or detention determination.” United States v.
Cook, 880 F.2d at 1162. The United States respectfully submits that the defendant
cannot meet his burden.
C. Tampering with a witness (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) and
Influencing an Officer (18 U.S.C. § 1503)
The United States incorporates by this reference all of the evidence, arguments,
and points and authorities advanced in it’s first Motion to Revoke Bond (Doc. 65), the
exhibits attached thereto (Docs. 66 & 67), the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing
on July 18 & 21, 2008, on the government’s motion (Doc. 150) and the exhibits received
in evidence at that hearing and further requests that this Court take judicial notice of the
complete record before it. The evidence received by the court at the hearing on July 18
and July 21, 2008, established that the defendant has committed numerous violations of
both of these Federal felony offenses. Additionally, his unfounded and defamatory
4 The false allegations of professional and sexual misconduct by the prosecutors
taken together with the demand in the attachment to the e-mail, entitled “Notice of
Motion Requesting a Change of Venue and to Have Both Prosecutors Recuses [sic]
Themselves from Said Cases as To Avoid the Appearance of A Conflict of Interest”
indicates that the defendant continues in his attempts to prevent the attorneys for the
government from prosecuting the cases now pending against him, a clear attempt to
corruptly influence these officers of the Court in the lawful performance of their duties.
12
claims of sexual misconduct by the prosecutors made in his e-mail of April 22, 2009,
coupled with the reiteration of his demand that they be recused from this case
establishes that the defendant continues to engage in conduct that constitutes a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, influencing an officer. 4 Likewise, his repetition of what
he knows to be false and defamatory allegations of illegal conduct by several of the
witnesses in that same e-mail further establishes probable cause to believe that he
continues to commit violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, witness tampering.
Unquestionably, the e-mail sent by the defendant on April 22, 2009, constitutes yet
another violation of the conditions of the defendant’s bond, establishes that he
continues to commit violations of these two criminal statutes and establishes that he is
unwilling to conform his behavior to the order of the court.
13
Conclusion
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that
the defendant’s Motion for Reinstatement of Pretrial Release be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Lanny D. Welch
United States Attorney
s/ Marietta Parker, KS Dist. Ct. #77807
First Assistant United States Attorney
500 State Avenue; Suite 360
Kansas City, Kansas 66101
Telephone: 913-551-6730
Facsimile: 913-551-6541
E-mail: marietta.parker@usdoj.gov
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
Attorneys for Plaintiff
14
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of June, 2009, the foregoing was electronically
filed with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of
electronic filing to the following:
John Duma
303 E. Poplar
Olathe, KS 66061
Attorney for Defendant Carrie Marie Neighbors
Cheryl A. Pilate
Morgan Pilate LLC
142 N. Cherry
Olathe, KS 66061
Attorney for Defendant Guy Madison Neighbors
I further certify that on this date the foregoing document and the notice of
electronic filing were mailed by first-class mail to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
None
s/Marietta Parker
First Assistant United States Attorney
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Sunday, June 7, 2009
Think people in charge can help...? think again
I discovered a pile of letters which were addressed to Guy. It seems that over the last few years Guy has been trying to file a complaint with everyone in power over the injustice being done to him.
Letters from public officials and people in power stating they can do nothing in the form of over sight
Letters from public officials and people in power stating they can do nothing in the form of over sight
Monday, June 1, 2009
LPD toute
Now the LPD is claiming to have strong ties to the FBI in Kansas....
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2009/may/31/city-police-chief-aids-federal-disaster-response/
In the Picture Chief Ron Olin of the Lawrence Police dept. The best part is if you read the blog postings on this story you can see members from the LPD are posting asking for me to make a post on the website so they can attack me...... I dont think so I aint fallin for that shizt...... I am still surprised that these are the same police that claimed blogging was stressing them out and yet here they are attacking other people of the community......
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